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ABSTRACT
Leary and Downs (1995) have recently proposed the sociometer hypothesis, in which 
they contend that self-esteem acts as a mental meter that serves the adaptive purpose of 
monitoring one’s degree of exclusion from social groups. Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999), 
however, have proposed that different interpersonal relationships would have posed 
different adaptive problems. Based upon evolutionary theory, they hypothesize that self­
esteem is more likely to be domain-specific, and that multiple sociometers should 
therefore exist to monitor different types of relationships.
Kirkpatrick and Ellis propose that previous research on self-esteem may be further 
expanded by utilizing their multiple-sociometer model. One example of such research is 
illustrated by Tesser and Cornell’s (1991) Study 1, in which they examine Self- 
Evaluation Maintenance (SEM). They conclude that affirmation, the recollection of an 
affinity for a personal interest, in any one highly self-relevant domain can offset a self­
esteem injury in any other domain.
The current experiment adapted the design of this study to test the domain-specific self­
esteem hypothesis. Specifically, it was hypothesized that an affirmation in the domain of 
mate-selection would differentially affect self-esteem as compared to an affirmation in a 
non-mate-selection domain, the coalitional domain.
All participants were male introductory psychology students, and ranged in age from 18 
to 22 years. Two participants participated for each experimental session; each supplied 
personal information via questionnaires and oral responses. Participants were led to 
believe that a third, female participant would use their information to decide with whom 
(of the two participants) she would participate later in the experiment. This third 
participant was fictional. All participants were informed that they were not chosen. Prior 
to receiving this information, participants affirmed in the domain of mate-selection, 
affirmed in the domain of coalitional relationships, affirmed in both of these domains, or 
affirmed in neither of these domains. After receiving the rejecting information, self­
esteem and self-concept clarity was assessed.
The results of the current experiment did not significantly demonstrate that the nature of 
the affirmation differentially affected self-esteem. Trends in the results did, however, 
support this differential effect. These nonsignificant results may reflect flaws in the 
specific hypotheses, or may be due to a number of potential problems with the current 
experiment.
DOMAIN-SPECIFICITY OF SELF-ESTEEM: 
AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH
INTRODUCTION
Self-esteem, a topic of great interest to both academics and non-academics alike, 
has been investigated from numerous perspectives by persons in many different fields. 
Operational definitions for self-esteem seem to be as numerous as the papers that present 
them, but most experimenters would agree that self-esteem entails some assessment of 
one’s own self-worth, resulting from some combination of cognitive and affective 
components (Leary & Downs, 1995; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995b; 
O’Connor, 1991; Ziller, Hagey, Smith, & Long, 1969). It is also well recognized that 
negative affect is associated with what is referred to as low self-esteem, and that positive 
affect is associated with what is known as high self-esteem. Low self-esteem is often 
associated with feelings such as helplessness, inferiority, inadequacy, and depression, 
whereas high self-esteem is often associated with feelings such as happiness, ambition, 
and optimism (Leary, Schreindorfer, & Haupt, 1995a; O’Connor, 1991).
A prevailing theme in much of the literature regarding self-esteem states or 
implies that, when self-esteem is low, humans have some sort of inherent motivation 
towards increasing it. In many cases, authors have claimed that this motivation to 
increase low self-esteem could be considered to be a primary motivation with an 
evolutionary basis (see O’Connor, 1991 and Stevens & Fiske, 1995 for examples). Many 
of these theories that tie self-esteem to evolution, however, glaze over the relationship of 
self-esteem with evolution and often amount to relatively simple asides in discussions of 
other hypotheses regarding self-esteem. For example, O’Conner (1991), although
2
3positing the relationship between thinking and feeling, mentions that he hypothesizes 
that self-esteem has an evolutionary basis because understanding reality is adaptive, and 
understanding reality leads to self-esteem. This is the extent to which O’Conner delves 
into the relationship between evolution and self-esteem; he does not fully explain in what 
way understanding reality was an adaptive problem nor does he fully explain how 
understanding reality is adaptively connected to self-esteem.
Barkow (1977, 1989), however, has presented a more thorough argument for an 
evolutionary basis of self-esteem; he hypothesizes that self-esteem is homologous to 
mechanisms relied upon in primate social dominance. Based upon information from non­
human primates, Barkow suggests that human self-esteem is a mechanism by which to 
gauge one’s place in a social hierarchy. He hypothesizes that self-esteem often functions 
at a non-conscious level, and that this method of dominance reasoning represents a highly 
evolved system that is not as costly as more explicit methods of social hierarchy 
determination (Barkow, 1977, 1989).
The Sociometer Model 
Building upon this evolutionary approach, and in response to what they think to 
be a general lack of effort to illuminate the purpose of self-esteem, Leary and Downs 
(1995) have proposed the sociometer hypothesis. They claim that self-esteem functions as 
a mental meter that monitors one’s degree of perceived social inclusion and exclusion. In 
particular, Leary and Downs hypothesize that this sociometer is sensitive to 
environmental stimuli that are indicative of decreased levels of social inclusion, such as 
rejection and decreased social affiliation. When increased levels of such stimuli are 
identified by one’s sociometer, one becomes motivated to increase social inclusion to a
4more optimal level. They theorize that this motivation is stimulated in a manner similar 
to that involved in other known biological drive systems (e.g. hunger, thirst, danger), in 
which affect serves as a motivator.
Leary and Downs’s (1995) hypothesis, therefore, takes the focus from self-esteem 
as the entity that one is motivated to increase (when it is low), and places it upon social 
inclusion. Leary et al. (1995b) have described this perspective change in terms of a car’s 
fuel gauge. They reason that, if an alien were not familiar with the purposes of driving a 
car, it could be reasonable for that alien to conclude that the goal of driving a car was to 
keep the fuel gauge away from the letter “E” (this would be analogous to the typical 
perspective that one possesses an extant motivation to avoid low self-esteem). Contrary 
to this perspective, however, a car’s fuel gauge is actually a monitor that keeps one from 
running out of gas (Leary et al., 1995b). Leary and Downs propose, by using the car’s gas 
as a metaphor for social inclusion, that self-esteem serves the adaptive purpose of 
monitoring one’s degree of social inclusion, thereby helping one to avoid social exclusion 
(an empty tank of gas).
In support of this hypothesis, Leary et al. (1995b) cite research suggesting that, 
over evolutionary time, people were more likely to survive if they were part of a social 
group. Leary et al. suggest, therefore, that the sociometer evolved as a means by which to 
afford one the ability to maintain some perception of a minimum degree of social 
inclusion. Hence, due to the increased survivability afforded by increased social 
inclusion, Leary et al. hypothesize that it was adaptive for one to have the ability to 
monitor one’s degree of social inclusion in order to avoid exclusion.
5To empirically examine the sociometer hypothesis, Leary et al. (1995b) began
by testing the fundamental assumption that self-esteem is related to perceived social
inclusion/exclusion. A series of five studies was conducted to test this assumption. The
series began with two correlational studies. The first study involved presenting
participants with hypothetical behaviors that varied in social desirability. Participants
then responded how they thought others would react to them if they had performed each
of the hypothetical behaviors. In the second study, participants wrote a paragraph about
%
the last time they had experienced one of four negative emotions (associated with 
exclusion) or one of four positive emotions (associated with inclusion). Leary et al. 
hypothesized that writing about these emotions would prompt participants to write about 
social inclusion/exclusion situations. Participants then rated how included/excluded they 
felt when they experienced the emotion about which they wrote. Both studies also used a 
scale to measure how the participants felt about themselves, either in the hypothetical 
situation (Study 1) or in the real situation (Study 2). In both studies, Leary et al. found a 
significant relationship between perceived inclusion/exclusion and how the participants 
felt about themselves. In particular, the more excluded the participants felt, the more 
likely it was that negative self-feelings were experienced; the more included the 
participants felt, the more likely it was that positive self-feelings were experienced.
In order to investigate the causal relationship between inclusion/exclusion and 
self-feelings, Leary et al. (1995b) also conducted two experiments. In both of these 
experiments, inclusion/exclusion was manipulated. In the first of these experiments,
Study 3, participants were informed that they were either included in or excluded from a 
decision-making group on the basis of either other potential group members’ opinions of
6the participant, based upon information provided by the participant, or random selection. 
All participants were actually randomly placed into experimental conditions. In Study 4, 
the second of these experiments, participants received inclusionary or exclusionary 
feedback (a third group was given no feedback) that was perceived by the participants to 
have been based upon a verbal presentation of personal information to an unseen person 
of the opposite sex. This verbal presentation was made using an intercom system. For this 
study, the intercom system was functional, and the person who was listening to the 
participant provided responses via the intercom system. The type of feedback that 
participants received, however, was actually based upon random selection, and did not 
depend upon the judgement of the third party that was listening to the participants’ oral 
responses. In both of these experiments, self-feelings were assessed after the 
manipulation. Results of both experiments indicated that negative self-feelings occurred 
as a result of exclusion, and positive self-feelings occurred as a result of inclusion.
Leary, Haupt, Strausser, and Chokel (1998) recently modified the design of Leary 
et al.’s (1995b) Study 4 in an experiment that used additional deception. In their 
Experiment 4, Leary et al. (1998) had participants provide self-referent information into a 
microphone. Unlike their previous study, however, the participants were only led to 
believe that another person was listening to their responses. Actually, there was no other 
person listening. Similar to Leary et al.’s (1995b) Study 4, participants were randomly 
selected to receive feedback that ranged from most rejecting to most accepting. 
Participants were, however, again led to believe that the feedback that they received was 
based upon the responses that they had provided.
7For the first four of their studies, Leary et al. (1995b) assessed participants’ self­
feelings. They claim that the self-feelings that participants reported in these studies 
represented the participants’ state self-esteem. Leary et al. interpret state self-esteem as 
the self-feelings that one is presently experiencing. Because state self-esteem is 
representative of one’s current self-feelings, they assume that state self-esteem therefore 
fluctuates, dependent upon the particular situations in which one is currently involved. In 
the fifth study conducted by Leary et al., however, they examined what they purport to be 
trait self-esteem. As they define it, trait self-esteem represents “some average level of 
self-esteem over situations and time” (Leary et al., 1995b, p. 519). Again referring to 
their fuel gauge metaphor, Leary et al. think that one’s trait self-esteem would represent 
the average spot at which the gauge’s “indicator needle” points. Regarding 
inclusion/exclusion from social groups, they feel that trait self-esteem represents one’s 
estimation of inclusionary status when stimuli indicative of this status are not currently 
available or present.
In their Study 5, Leary et al. (1995b) hoped to show that individual differences in 
trait self-esteem were related to individual differences in perceived feelings of general 
inclusion/exclusion. Participants completed a scale designed to measure perceived 
inclusionary status and two measures of general self-esteem. A negative correlation was 
found between perceived exclusionary status and two measures of self-esteem; as 
perceived exclusionary status increased, self-esteem decreased. The results of Leary et 
al.’s five studies, therefore, support the fundamental assumption of Leary and Downs’s 
sociometer hypothesis that self-esteem is related to perceived social inclusion/exclusion.
8A Proposed Extension of the Sociometer Model 
In light of these findings, Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) suggest in a forthcoming 
chapter that, although the sociometer hypothesis presents a promising approach to the 
derivation of the purpose of self-esteem, Leary and Downs’s (1995) apparent assumption 
that self-esteem is a singular sociometer, which is sensitive to all types of social 
inclusion, is questionable. Basing their argument upon evolutionary theory, Kirkpatrick 
and Ellis propose that, if the creation of a sociometer was the evolutionary response to the 
adaptive problem of identifying social exclusion, it would not have been adaptive for 
humans to have evolved a single sociometer that was sensitive to social exclusion from 
all types of interpersonal relationships.
Evolutionary Theory
The modem evolutionary theory upon which Kirkpatrick and Ellis base their 
argument predicts that the human mind is composed of specific, species-universal, 
cognitive processes termed psychological mechanisms (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). 
Evolutionary psychologists postulate that each psychological mechanism represents the 
evolved solution to a specific adaptive problem that was faced over evolutionary time. In 
particular, these psychological mechanisms evolved because those who possessed them 
were better suited for both personal survival and the survival of their genetic information, 
whether by way of their own reproduction or the subsequent survival and reproduction of 
their kin (Buss, 1995; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Trivers, 1985).
Those who had these evolutionary processes were better suited to survival and 
reproduction due to the dual role of psychological mechanisms. To begin with, 
psychological mechanisms act as information-processing devices that function to
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discriminate certain input in order to specify the particular problem one is facing (Tooby 
& Cosmides, 1992). In other words, a psychological mechanism first serves to afford the 
identification of a specific problem by way of the characteristics that are specific to it. 
Once a specific problem is identified, these mechanisms then act as decision rules that 
transform the processed information into output that either regulates physiological 
activity or produces action, in an attempt to solve the particular problem (Buss, 1995). 
These mechanisms are therefore content-specific; each has evolved to be sensitive to and 
solve specific problems encountered over evolutionary time. Research to date has 
suggested that psychological mechanisms exist that solve specific problems such as those 
relating to landscape preference, cheater detection, and mate selection, to name just a few 
(c.f. Buss, 1995; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Orians & Heerwagen, 1992). Evolutionary 
theory thus suggests that, due to the many different adaptive problems that must have 
been encountered over evolutionary time, many such specific psychological mechanisms 
must exist.
Self-Esteem and Domain-Specificitv
Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) hypothesize that, from this evolutionary perspective, 
different types of interpersonal relationships would have posed different adaptive 
problems. Some of these may have been such specific problems as: establishing and 
maintaining coalitional relationships with same-sex members, avoiding potential fights 
with same-sex competitors, and selecting, attracting, and retaining desirable mates. 
Because they hypothesize that each type of interpersonal relationship posed its own 
specific adaptive problems, and that each problem would therefore be represented by 
specific, distinguishing stimuli, Kirkpatrick and Ellis propose that specific sociometers
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should exist to monitor the adaptive problems associated with each type of specific 
relationship. Kirkpatrick and Ellis therefore hypothesize that self-esteem is “domain- 
specific.” They further conclude that Leary and Downs (1995), by hypothesizing that 
self-esteem acts as a sociometer that is sensitive to generalized information regarding 
social exclusion, do not address the existence of multiple domains of self-esteem and 
therefore the possible existence of multiple sociometers. (Both Leary and Downs and 
Kirkpatrick and Ellis, although positing the association between self-esteem and 
interpersonal relationships, do not assume that self-esteem can only be affected via social 
information. Previous researchers, such as Bandura, 1977, have suggested that self- 
efficacy [self-esteem] can be affected by an intrinsic realization of one’s ability for 
specific behaviors. Such alternative means by which to affect self-esteem, however, will 
not be addressed in the current discussion.)
The concept of “domain-specific” or “specific” self-esteem, however, is not new 
to the self-esteem literature. Rosenberg, Schooler, Schoenbach, and Rosenberg (1995), 
for example, have defined self-esteem as an attitude towards oneself, and feel that 
specific self-esteem is a specific attitude towards a specific facet of oneself. Rosenberg et 
al. base this conceptualization in part upon research that was conducted, using the 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, that discovered two independent factors, called self- 
confidence and self-deprecation. Due to the loading on these two factors, it was 
concluded that these they must represent two separate components of self-esteem.
Building upon these conclusions, Rosenberg et al. (1995) have recently 
hypothesized that specific self-esteem is related to one’s specific, corresponding 
behaviors, whereas global self-esteem is related to one’s overall well-being. They
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therefore state, in a manner similar to Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999), that they would not 
expect global self-esteem to evidence much about one’s perceived efficacy in a specific 
behavior, but would expect specific self-esteem to be a better predictor of that specific 
behavior. In order to demonstrate this hypothesis, Rosenberg et al. have examined what 
they have operationalized as “academic self-esteem” as one variant of specific self­
esteem. To do so, they used Bachman’s School Ability Self-Concept Index as an 
assessment of academic self-esteem. In support of their hypothesis, they found academic 
self-esteem to be more highly correlated to school performance than global self-esteem 
(as assessed by the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; Rosenberg, et al., 1995). Due to these 
findings, further data collection has led Rosenberg et al. to conclude, again in a similar 
manner to that of Kirkpatrick and Ellis, that, in order to affect school performance, one 
must affect academic self-esteem and not global self-esteem.
Rosenberg et al. (1995) also based their specific self-esteem hypotheses upon 
research completed by Marsh, who has done a significant amount of work on specific 
aspects of the self-concept (c.f. Marsh, 1986; Marsh & O’Neill, 1984). In particular, 
Marsh and O’Neill (1984) discovered specific facets of the self-concept that were of 
“remarkable clarity” when factor-analyzing their Self Description Questionnaire III (SDQ 
III), which had been created to assess the self-concepts of late adolescents. This factor 
analysis revealed thirteen factors of the self-concept, including factors such as: 
Mathematics, Verbal, Academic, and Physical Abilities/Sports (Marsh & O’Neill, 1984). 
Marsh and O’Neill hypothesize that each of these thirteen factors are distinct dimensions 
of the self-concept, in contrast to the General-Self factor, which they define as that
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assessed by the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. Marsh and O’Neill, therefore, would 
hypothesize that each of these factors represents a specific facet of self-esteem.
Another example of work that has defined what has been operationalized as 
specific domains of self-esteem has been completed by Luhtanen and Crocker (1992). 
Unlike Rosenberg et al. and Marsh, however, the research conducted by Luhtanen and 
Crocker does not focus upon specific behaviors as the origins of specific self-esteem, but 
upon facets of what they term collective self-esteem. In particular, collective self-esteem 
is operationalized by Luhtanen and Crocker (1992, p. 303) to ..denote those aspects of 
identity that have to do with memberships in social groups and the value placed on one’s 
social groups, respectively.” In an attempt to create a measure to assess collective self­
esteem, Luhtanen and Crocker created a scale, the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSES). 
Upon factor-analysis of the CSES, they identified what they believe to be different 
factors of collective self-esteem: 1) Membership, the degree to which one believes that 
one is a worthy member of one’s social groups, 2) Private, one’s personal beliefs of how 
good one’s social groups are, 3) Public, one’s beliefs of how other people view one’s 
social groups, and 4) Identity, the importance of one’s social groups to one’s self- 
concept. Luhtanen and Crocker, therefore, also posit the existence of specific facets of 
self-esteem.
Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) acknowledge the existence of different hypotheses of 
specific self-esteem, and agree that self-esteem can be factor analyzed from a number of 
different perspectives in order to demonstrate these different facets. However,
Kirkpatrick and Ellis stress that discovering specific facets of self-esteem by this manner 
is a purely descriptive exercise. That is, these factors are determined on an arbitrary basis,
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such as factor analysis. They further argue that an evolutionary approach, on the other 
hand, offers a non-arbitrary, functional manner by which to differentiate self-esteem.
Cooperative relationships. Even though they hypothesize that it is more likely that 
self-esteem is domain-specific, Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) admit that not enough data 
have been collected to determine how many domain-specific sociometers one possesses 
or their individual level of specificity. They do, however, suggest that domains of self­
esteem may fall into two broad categories: those dealing with “cooperative” relationships 
and those dealing with “competitive” relationships (Kirkpatrick & Ellis, 1999). Although 
they would hypothesize that the individual domains of self-esteem included in either of 
these categories represent solutions to specific adaptive problems, they nonetheless 
conclude that the domains in one of these categories represent evolved solutions to 
adaptive problems that were fundamentally different from those that were solved by the 
domains of self-esteem included in the other category.
To begin with, they hypothesize that cooperative sociometers function in a 
manner similar to that hypothesized by Leary and Downs (1995), insomuch that they help 
one to assess degree of perceived exclusion from types of cooperative relationships, such 
as those involved in social exchange, coalitions and alliances, and friendships 
(Kirkpatrick & Ellis, 1999). Utilizing work such as that conducted by Luhtanen and 
Crocker (1992), they expand upon Leary and Downs’s perspective, however, and 
hypothesize that these sociometers may also function to assess both the quality of one’s 
social group and the quality of one’s personal contribution to that social group. By so 
hypothesizing, Kirkpatrick and Ellis suggest that low self-esteem does not simply 
motivate one to avoid exclusion, but that it may serve to motivate one to take more
14
specific action, such as strengthening one’s own group, switching alliances, or joining 
a new group, each depending upon the specific situation.
Competitive relationships. Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) presume that the 
information to which a competitive sociometer would be sensitive is fundamentally 
different from that which is indicative of more cooperative relationships. This 
presumption is based upon hypotheses regarding the relationship between self-esteem and 
a self-concept known in the animal-behavior literature as resource-holding potential 
(RHP; Gilbert, Price, & Allan, 1995). RHP is considered to be an evolved system that 
allows one to assess the likelihood that one can either defend one’s own resources from 
competitors or challenge the resources o f others. (Although it is not always explicitly 
stated, it is implied that there are sex differences with regard to RHP. In particular, the 
literature implies that RHP is a system that is primarily possessed and utilized by males.) 
Therefore, when competing individuals come in contact with each other, one can 
potentially determine one’s RHP as being lower than, higher than, or the same as that 
possessed by those others. This is accomplished by comparatively assessing stimuli that 
are indicative of fighting ability and dominance, such as size and apparent strength. For 
individuals who perceive their RHP as either higher or lower than that of competitors, 
this system allows one to affect the outcome of a competitive interaction without physical 
contact. If one perceives one’s RHP as lower than that of others, that individual backs off 
or otherwise submits; if one perceives one’s RHP as higher than that of others, that 
individual attacks or employs some other dominant action. If competitive individuals 
determine, however, that their respective RHP’s are essentially equal, a fight or direct 
competition ensues, after which the loser’s RHP decreases and the winner’s RHP
15
increases. Research has suggested, therefore, that natural selection favored those 
individuals who were more often able to determine their comparative value without 
incurring the excessive costs associated with direct, physical combat (see Dawkins, 1989 
for a thorough discussion of this phenomenon).
Researchers who have investigated RHP hypothesize that, for humans, RHP may 
represent the evolutionary foundations of self-esteem (Gilbert et al., 1995). They base 
this hypothesis upon research that has suggested that self-esteem in part functions in a 
manner similar to that of RHP, in that it often helps one to determine the degree to which 
one will either be able to defend one’s resources or challenge the resources of others 
(Gilbert et al., 1995). This perspective is in many ways similar to the previously 
discussed perspective that has been posited by Barkow (1977, 1989). In particular, an 
assessment of comparative value that results in action that indicates that one is either of 
lower, higher, or similar RHP as a competitor might subsequently allow one to gauge 
one’s respective place in a social hierarchy.
Based upon these conclusions regarding RHP, Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) 
hypothesize that competitive sociometers would be sensitive to socially comparative 
information, thereby allowing one to assess how one stacks up to others in competitive 
domains. Having access to this information would allow one to assess one’s relative 
value, and would serve the adaptive purpose of guiding appropriate behavior, based upon 
that assessment. That appropriate behavior, however, would vary, dependent upon the 
information that is provided by the appropriate competitive sociometer. If one’s 
competitive sociometer provides one with information that leads one to perceive that one 
is of lower competitive value (low self-esteem), the appropriate behavior would most
16
likely be to take some sort of submissive action. On the other hand, if one’s 
competitive sociometer provides one with information that leads one to perceive that one 
is of higher competitive value (high self-esteem), the appropriate behavior would most 
likely be to take some sort of aggressive or dominant action. A more competitively 
orientated sociometer, therefore, would function to both monitor external stimuli 
indicative of competitions and subsequently motivate one to select a strategy or prefer a 
specific behavior that is most appropriate, given one’s perceived relative competitive 
value (Dawkins, 1989; Kirkpatrick & Ellis, 1999).
Mate-selection: A competitive domain. To further illustrate their hypotheses, 
Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) use the paradigm of mate-selection to represent what they 
assume to be an example of an “inherently competitive” domain. They first discuss the 
topic of mate-value. a term that they adopted to describe a concept outlined by Kenrick, 
Groth, Trost, and Sadalla (1993). Kenrick et al. (1993) have proposed that mate-selection 
is a variant of social exchange, in which persons of each sex look for the best value in an 
opposite-sex mate. In order to find the best value, they hypothesize that people assess the 
mate-selection “market value” of other people of the opposite sex (Kenrick et al., 1993). 
They further propose that, if everyone were motivated to find someone of the best mate- 
value, people would tend to pair up with opposite sex others with similar mate-value, in a 
sense exchanging their mate-value with that person.
Despite the parallels between mate-selection and social exchange paradigms, 
Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) stress that mate-selection is ultimately a zero-sum contest, 
where one person’s success is another’s failure. With this in mind, they propose that 
mate-value is an assessment of one’s mate-selection market value relative to the mate-
17
selection market value of other potential same-sex competitors. A mate-selection 
competitive sociometer, therefore, allows one to assess one’s own mate-value by 
attending to specific information, such as mate-selection social feedback, success and 
failure in mating situations, and current mating status and mating satisfaction 
(Kirkpatrick and Ellis, 1999). Once this assessment is made, they hypothesize that one’s 
perceived mate-value will serve to guide one in mating-partner preferences and also help 
one to choose appropriate mating strategies.
This perspective of self-esteem aiding one in determining one’s mate-value and 
subsequently guiding appropriate behavior is shared by Wright (1994). Specifically, 
Wright concludes that people use their self-esteem to determine appropriate mating 
behaviors. He posits that, for example, males with high self-esteem are more likely to 
choose a mating strategy in which they seek more “short-term conquests” (i.e. short-term, 
predominantly sexual relationships with females). He bases this postulation on the 
conclusion that males with high self-esteem are more likely to be good-looking and/or 
possess high-status, and that such short-term conquests (and therefore more females) will 
be more accessible to such males. In contrast, however, he hypothesizes that males with 
very low self-esteem may adopt a different mating strategy, which may include rape. 
Wright comments that rape is known to be present in many cultures, and often occurs 
because a male can not obtain a mate by more “legitimate” means.
Previous research has suggested that humans determine mate-value by assessing 
traits for which they have an evolved preference. For example, past researchers who have 
studied mate-selection have observed that a number of different male characteristics 
appear to be sexually attractive to females (c.f. Buss, 1988, 1989, 1992, 1994; Kenrick et
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al., 1993). It has been suggested that the male characteristics that females find sexually 
attractive are primarily related to three general roles that males play in reproduction: 
those dealing with provision, protection, and parenting (Ellis, 1992). It is further 
theorized that males took upon these reproductive roles in order to solve applicable 
adaptive problems that arose in our evolutionary past. Researchers suggest, therefore, that 
females who favored characteristics in their mates that were indices of increased ability 
to effectively accomplish these roles were more likely to survive and produce and raise 
viable offspring (who themselves successfully reproduce; Buss, 1992, 1994; Ellis, 1992).
Mate-selection research that has adopted this evolutionary perspective has 
suggested types of traits that females both should have and do find sexually attractive in 
males. To begin with, it has been suggested that one of the most important male mate- 
selection characteristics deals with resource possession (Buss, 1988, 1989, 1992, 1994). 
Buss (1992) hypothesizes that resource possession is one of the most important male 
mate-selection characteristics because of the inherent benefits females gain from 
increased access to resources, for both themselves and their offspring. In particular, 
increased access to resources affords immediate survival benefits to both mate and 
offspring and increases future survivability both directly (resources explicitly available) 
and indirectly (offspring may inherit the traits that led the father to have increased 
resource possession).
Buss (1992, 1994) also notes, however, that resources take time to acquire, and 
females often must choose a mate that is too young to have yet amassed significant 
resources. His data suggest that females overcome this obstacle by assessing a possible 
mate’s resource potential. Given that potential is not something that can be directly
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observed, however, it is not obvious how females make this assessment. In response, it 
has been suggested that one’s resource potential can be represented by indicators such as 
ambitiousness and hard work (Buss, 1992, 1994; Ellis, 1992). For example, studying 
traits that might predict past and current success in the workplace, Buss (1994) found that 
hard work was the best predictor of income and promotions. It has also been suggested 
that intelligence is a good predictor of future resource possession (Buss, 1992).
In addition to those traits dealing with resource possession or resource potential, it 
has also been suggested that a male’s physical prowess is a highly attractive mate- 
selection characteristic. In particular, a male that was physically dominant had a greater 
likelihood of prevailing over others of the same sex, so as to both protect resources that 
were possessed and also acquire the resources of others (Buss, 1988; Ellis, 1992). Such 
males also had a greater likelihood of providing sufficient protection, from same sex 
competitors, for both mate and offspring (Buss, 1994). Buss (1994) has suggested that a 
male’s physical prowess is often displayed through feats of athletic ability.
When given a choice among potentially attractive male characteristics, females 
often choose those that deal with “love” and “kindness” as their most desired traits (Buss, 
1992; Ellis, 1992). Buss (1992) has hypothesized that traits relating to these personal 
characteristics may be indicative of the degree to which a male is willing to provide a 
female with his resources. If this were true, however, he hypothesizes that generalized 
kindness should not be as desirable as kindness that was specifically focused upon a 
given female, indicating a male’s desire to solely impart resources to that female. Buss 
admits, however, that not enough data have been collected to more fully support these 
hypotheses.
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In addition to these male traits and characteristics, the literature suggests that 
other male traits and characteristics are also found to be sexually attractive by females.
To begin with, physical attractiveness is an important indicator of physical health, 
dominance, and resource possession. For example, it is suggested that females generally 
prefer taller men to shorter men because height is in many ways an indicator of physical 
dominance (Buss, 1992, 1994). In addition, because resources take time to acquire, older 
males are more likely to have a greater amount of resources, and therefore male traits that 
are indicative of “maturity” are often found by females to be more attractive (Buss, 1992; 
Ellis, 1992; Kenrick et al., 1993). Third, dependability may be a further indication of 
willingness to provide and protect (Buss, 1994). Indications of fidelity may also be 
desirable, but, because a female’s maternity is never in question, this should only be 
important when it is indicative of resource allocation (i.e. infidelity may be an indication 
that resources are being directed elsewhere; Buss, 1992, 1994).
It has been suggested that, due to their reproductive and adaptive importance, all 
of the traits that females find sexually attractive serve as important indicators of a male’s 
mate-value (Ellis, 1992; Kenrick et al., 1993; Kirkpatrick & Ellis, 1999). Because these 
characteristics are indicative of one’s value, each characteristic has the potential to be 
perceived by others to fall anywhere on a continuum of desirability, ranging from highly 
desirable to highly undesirable. Due to individual variability, however, it is likely that, 
for any one male, each of these characteristics will not be perceived to be of similar 
desirability. For example, a male may be considered to be highly physically attractive, 
but may possess little or no resources. Due to this variability, one can conceive of mate- 
value as being based upon the sum total of these individual characteristics.
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Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) hypothesize that it is possible that a sociometer 
that monitors mate-selection information may primarily function during specific 
circumstances that require one to determine one’s relative mate-value. In particular, one’s 
mate-selection sociometer may be “turned on” when one is on the mating market (i.e. 
does not currently have a mate or is otherwise looking for one), because one is actively 
attempting to acquire a mate, a process that requires one to establish one’s relative mate- 
value. When one is in a dating or other long term mating relationship, however, one’s 
mate-selection sociometer may be deactivated because one no longer has immediate need 
to assess one’s comparative mate-value.
Building upon Leary and Downs’s sociometer hypothesis, and utilizing 
evolutionary theory, Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) propose hypotheses that may provide 
more information regarding the purposes of self-esteem. Starting with the prediction that 
self-esteem is more likely to be domain-specific, they have expanded previous ideas 
regarding self-esteem and interpersonal interaction and have suggested that sociometers 
function to both monitor social exclusion and provide one with comparative personal 
value. Admittedly, however, little empirical work has been conducted to test these 
hypotheses, and Kirkpatrick and Ellis therefore do not have a wealth of data to support 
them. The current experiment is an attempt to take a small step toward rectifying this 
situation. In particular, the current experiment compares a competitive and cooperative 
domain of self-esteem in an attempt to demonstrate the domain-specificity of self-esteem.
Evidence for Domains of Self-Esteem
To demonstrate the domain-specificity of self-esteem, one must first be able to 
identify such domains. This is no small task, as Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) have
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indicated that neither the number nor degree of specificity of any domain is currently 
known. As noted earlier, Kirkpatrick and Ellis have, however, suggested that domains of 
self-esteem may fall into the general categories of those relating to cooperative and of 
those relating to competitive relationships. In line with this hypothesis, I recently 
collected data that suggest that, what I operationalize as coalitional (cooperative) and 
mate-selection (competitive) self-esteem, may, to some degree, represent two distinct 
domains of self-esteem (Williams, 1998; Williams & Kirkpatrick, 1998, 1999). 
Mate-Selection Self-Esteem
In a recent study, I created items that were hypothesized to be related to mate- 
selection in order to construct a scale that assessed mate-selection self-esteem (Williams, 
1998). In its original incarnation, this scale was composed of eight mate-selection-related 
items. Each item was created so that participants could respond with the degree to which 
they agreed with each item via a five-point Likert-type scale. One such item was: “I 
sometimes wish I were more physically attractive.” Participants were presented with this 
scale, in addition to other scales (such as the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale and the CSES) 
and items that were hypothesized to be related to mate-selection self-esteem (such as 
“What do you feel are the chances that one of the most popular persons of the opposite 
sex on campus would ask you out?”).
Reliability. The results of this study suggested that the original, eight-item version 
of the mate-selection self-esteem scale was internally consistent (a  = .76; item-total 
correlations ranging from .21 to .73; n = 78). Despite these findings, I created additional 
items in order to attempt to increase this scale’s internal consistency.
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In an attempt to increase the internal consistency of the mate-selection self­
esteem scale, twelve additional mate-selection related items were created. These new 
items were similar to those that I originally created. One example of these new mate- 
selection self-esteem items is: “I often worry about what people of the opposite sex think 
about me.” As with the original mate-selection self-esteem items, these items were 
created to elicit the degree to which one agreed with each item, using a five-point Likert- 
type response scale. These new items were evaluated in another study that I recently 
conducted (Williams & Kirkpatrick, 1998). For this study, participants were presented 
with these new mate-selection self-esteem items along with the eight original mate- 
selection self-esteem items. Once the data were collected, the new mate-selection self­
esteem items were evaluated separate from and combined with the original eight items, in 
addition to a separate evaluation of only the original eight items. The original eight items 
were found to have an alpha of .70, the twelve new items were found to have an alpha of 
.83, and all twenty of the mate-selection self-esteem items combined were found to have 
an alpha of .88 (the item-total correlations for all items ranged from .21 to .64, n = 101).
With the results of this most recent study, I decided to attempt to reduce the total 
number of mate-selection self-esteem items without significantly affecting their internal 
consistency. In order to do so, all of the items were sorted by item-total correlation. Once 
these items were sorted in this manner, the twelve items with the highest item-total 
correlations were separated from the rest (these items also had the lowest “alpha if 
deleted” value). These twelve items were composed of four of the original mate-selection 
self-esteem items and eight of the new mate-selection self-esteem items. The item-total
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correlations for these twelve items ranged from .49 to .64, and the alpha if deleted 
ranged from .88 to .87, respectively (recall that the alpha for all of the items was .88).
Once these items were separated, a separate reliability analysis was run on these 
items. This analysis revealed that the twelve items were internally consistent, with an 
overall alpha of .88 (recall that n = 101). Because the internal consistency of this mate- 
selection self-esteem scale remained relatively the same even though eight items were 
removed, I included these twelve items as a group in a recent mass-testing procedure (see 
Appendix A for a list of all twelve of these mate-selection self-esteem items; Williams & 
Kirkpatrick, 1999). The analysis of the data collected from this procedure revealed that 
the twelve mate-selection self-esteem items were again found to be internally consistent, 
with an overall alpha of .86 (item-total correlations ranged from .35 to .67, n = 455).
Validity. So as to assess the validity of the original, eight-item version of the 
mate-selection self-esteem scale, correlation and regression analyses were conducted on 
data that were recently collected (Williams, 1998). For example, correlational analyses 
indicated that the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (i.e. global self-esteem), the mate- 
selection self-esteem scale, and the coalitional self-esteem scale were all significantly 
related to items that I had hypothesized would be related to mate-selection self-esteem. 
Despite these significant correlations, regression analyses revealed that, in equations 
containing all three self-esteem measures as independent variables, the mate-selection 
self-esteem scale was the only significant predictor of these same items. These and other 
similar results led me to conclude that this version of the mate-selection self-esteem scale 
was a good measure of mate-selection self-esteem (Williams, 1998).
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Similar results from data collected in another recent study led me to believe 
that the twelve-item version of the mate-selection self-esteem scale was also a good 
measure of mate-selection self-esteem (Williams & Kirkpatrick, 1998). For example, 
compared with the Rosenberg and coalitional self-esteem scales, the mate-selection self­
esteem scale was the only scale that was significantly related to items concerning 
participants’ dating status.
Coalitional Self-Esteem
Unlike the mate-selection self-esteem scale, which I created to assess a 
competitive domain, the second domain-specific self-esteem scale was constructed to 
assess a cooperative domain. In particular, this scale was constructed to assess coalitional 
self-esteem. This scale is composed of eight items that were hypothesized to be related to 
coalitional self-esteem. One such item that was used was: “My partners on group projects 
believe that I have much to offer” (see Appendix B for a comprehensive list of all 
coalitional self-esteem items). As with the mate-selection self-esteem scale, I created the 
items in this scale to assess the degree to which one agreed with each item, using a five- 
point Likert-type response scale. This scale was also recently included in a recent study, 
along with other scales (such as the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale and the CSES) and 
items that were hypothesized to be related to coalitional self-esteem (such as “Whenever 
I work as part of a group for a class, it seems as if my opinions are often ignored.”; 
Williams, 1998).
Reliability and validity. The items in this scale were recently found to be 
internally consistent (a  = .83, item-total correlations ranging from .41 to .68, n = 78;
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Williams, 1998). These findings were again confirmed in another recent study (a  =
.75, item-total correlations ranging from .29 to .64, n = 101; Williams & Kirkpatrick, 
1998).
So as to assess the validity of the coalitional self-esteem scale, analyses were 
conducted on the data collected in both of these previous studies. For example, results 
from the first of these two studies indicated that, relative to the Rosenberg and mate- 
selection self-esteem scales, the coalitional self-esteem scale was the only significant 
predictor of an item that I thought would be related to coalitional self-esteem, whether 
participants felt that they accomplished more when they worked alone (Williams, 1998). 
Results o f the second of these previous studies were similar to those of the first. For 
example, relative to the Rosenberg and mate-selection self-esteem scales, the coalitional 
self-esteem scale was the only significant predictor of loneliness, a construct that I 
thought would be related to coalitional self-esteem (Williams & Kirkpatrick, 1998).
These and other similar results led me to conclude that the coalitional self-esteem scale 
was a valid measure of coalitional self-esteem.
Previous studies that I have conducted have suggested that mate-selection self­
esteem (a competitive domain) and coalitional self-esteem (a cooperative domain) may 
represent, to some degree, domains of self-esteem. At the very least, these studies suggest 
that coalitional and mate-selection self-esteem can be assessed both separately from each 
other and from global self-esteem (i.e. the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale).
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Applications of the Domain-Specific Hypothesis 
The Domain-Specific Hypothesis, as Applied to Previous Sociometer Research
Unlike their Study 3, participants in Leary et al.’s (1995b) Study 4 supplied 
personal information to an individual who was of the opposite sex. Despite this 
potentially interesting procedural addition, Leary et al. neither hypothesized nor found 
data that suggested that participants were differently affected (compared to the results 
from their Study 3, in which the third party was composed of persons of the same sex as 
the participant). This is not particularly surprising. As has been previously discussed, 
Leary et al. imply that they hypothesize that one possesses a generalized sociometer that 
is sensitive to generalized social exclusion information. In line with this hypothesis,
Leary et al. utilized a dependent measure in their Study 4 that assessed global self- 
evaluation (global self-esteem). It is very likely, therefore, that if perceived rejection by 
someone of the opposite sex (in their study) affected the participants’ mate-selection self­
esteem, a measure designed to assess global self-esteem would not be sensitive enough to 
thoroughly assess the effects.
An experiment was recently conducted, however, that replicated Leary et al.’s 
(1995b) Study 4, in an attempt to address these issues. Glenn (1998) developed an 
experimental design for his Study 2 that was similar to that of Leary et al.’s except for a 
few modifications. To begin with, the perceived sex of the third party was manipulated; 
half of Glenn’s participants were given the perception that the third party was the same 
sex (as them) and the other half of the participants were given the perception that the 
third party was of the opposite sex. In addition to this procedural change, the dating status 
of the participants was also controlled so that half of the participants were in a
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heterosexual dating relationship and half were not. Finally, in addition to utilizing the 
measure of global self-assessment that was employed by Leary et al., Glenn used the 
eight-item version of the measure of mate-selection self-esteem that I recently created 
(Williams, 1998).
The procedure of Glenn’s (1998) Study 2 was similar to that of Leary et al.’s 
(1995b) Study 4. At the beginning of the experimental session, participants were 
informed that they would be interacting with another participant (there actually was no 
other participant). Participants then completed a sheet requesting biographical 
information, and received a biographical sheet that was purported to have been completed 
by the person with whom they were to be interacting. The sheet that they received, 
however, had been completed by the experimenter so as to give participants the 
impression that the other participant was either the same or the opposite sex of the 
participant. The gender that was portrayed on this sheet was selected randomly for each 
participant. Participants then orally responded to the same self-referent questions used by 
Leary et al. in their Study 4. Participants responded to these questions for five minutes 
into a microphone; they were given the impression that the other participant was listening 
to their responses in another room.
After the participants had orally responded for five minutes, they received a sheet 
that was alleged to have been provided by the other participant. Participants were 
informed that this sheet contained feedback that was based upon the participant’s oral 
responses. This feedback ostensibly indicated the degree to which the other participant 
either “liked, accepted, or wanted to interact with” (positive feedback) or “did not like, 
accept, or want to interact with” (negative feedback) the participant (Glenn, 1998). This
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sheet was actually completed by the experimenter, and the nature of the feedback (i.e. 
either positive or negative) that participants received was randomly determined. It was 
hoped that these alterations to Leary et al.’s (1995b) design would be sufficient to 
demonstrate the domain-specificity of mate-selection self-esteem by illustrating an 
interaction between the type of feedback that participants received, the sex of the third 
party, and the current dating status of the participant. Unfortunately, this interaction was 
not found to be significant for any of the utilized dependent measures (the mate-selection 
self-esteem scale, the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, and the measure of global self- 
assessment that was used by Leary et al.).
It is possible that significant results were not found in Glenn’s (1998) experiment 
because the perceived rejection by someone of the opposite sex did not significantly 
affect the participants’ mate-selection self-esteem. Looking at this from the perspective 
proposed by Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999), it is possible that the information that was 
indicative of the perceived rejection was not interpreted by the participants’ mate- 
selection sociometers. This would lead one to hypothesize, therefore, that participants did 
not interpret the perceived rejection as occurring in a mate-selection context, and may in 
fact have been interpreted it in a different context. Specifically, due to the lack of a 
competitive component in the perceived rejection, the rejection may have been 
interpreted as occurring in a cooperative domain.
I believe that the design that Glenn (1998) utilized could be enhanced by more 
fully applying the hypotheses recently posited by Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999). In 
particular, based upon their assumption that mate-selection is an inherently competitive 
domain, Glenn’s design might benefit from an attempt to orchestrate the perceived
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rejection so that it will be more likely that participants will interpret the rejection in a 
mate-selection context. This might be affected if the perceived rejection was placed in a 
competitive paradigm, where participants would not only be rejected by someone of the 
opposite sex, but would be rejected in lieu of someone else who is the same sex as the 
participant.
A Potential Application for the Domain-Specific Hypothesis
Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) propose that previous research on self-esteem may be 
further informed and expanded by utilizing their multiple-sociometer model. One such 
line of inquiry that could benefit from this perspective is demonstrated by research, 
conducted by Tesser and Cornell (1991), that examines a phenomenon known as Self- 
Evaluation Maintenance (SEM). In their Study 1, Tesser and Cornell examined the 
effects of a lost competition upon one’s global self-esteem. Given Kirkpatrick and Ellis’s 
hypotheses about the possible existence of sociometers that monitor competitive 
domains, this experiment represents a paradigm that might be expanded by adopting their 
domain-specific perspective.
Tesser and Cornell’s (1991) design for their Study 1 entailed a perceived 
competitive situation, in which the participants’ global self-esteem was adversely 
affected by the perceived superior performance of either a friend or a stranger in either a 
domain of high or low self-relevance (to the participant). Participants first completed a 
task that was hypothesized to be of either high or low self-relevance. In the high self­
relevance condition, the task was called a “Verbal Skills Task.” Participants were 
informed that their performance on this task was positively correlated to intelligence and 
scores on tests like the Graduate Record Exam (GRE). It was therefore hypothesized that
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participants would view their performance on this task as highly self-relevant. In the 
low self-relevance condition, the task was referred to as a “Password” type of game (note 
that the word game was used instead of task, in order to make it appear less important). 
Participants were informed that the experimenters did not know of anything with which 
performance on the Password game was correlated, and that performance may in fact not 
be related to anything at all. It was therefore hypothesized that participants would view 
their performance on the Password game as being of low self-relevance.
Despite the different descriptors used for the high and low self-relevance 
conditions, all participants actually completed the same task. Participants guessed an 
unknown word based upon clues that were provided by the experimenters. Participants 
were given four clues for each word and were given a total o f eight unknown words. All 
participants, regardless of condition, were later informed that they were outperformed by 
both a friend of theirs (who had accompanied them to the experiment) and a stranger.
Prior to the participants’ receipt of the information that someone else 
outperformed them, another variable, which Tesser and Cornell (1991) call “affirmation,” 
was manipulated. Affirmation, for their Study 1, is operationalized as offering a 
participant an opportunity to recall superior performance in or affinity for a personal 
interest domain. Experimentally, affirmation entailed the participant answering questions 
that pertained to a domain that was of either high or low self-relevance.
In order to discover a domain of high self-relevance for each participant, Tesser 
and Cornell (1991) devised a procedure that utilized the dominant interests in personality 
outlined in the Allport-Vemon “Study of Values” scale. To begin with, Tesser and 
Cornell imply that they presented participants with descriptions of each of the six
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Allport-Vemon categories of dominant interests at the onset of an experimental 
session. For example, one such interest category is called “Theoretical” (Allport, Vemon, 
& Lindzey, 1970). The category description that is offered for this category is:
The Theoretical. The dominant interest of the theoretical man is the discovery of 
truth. In the pursuit of this goal he characteristically takes a ‘cognitive’ attitude, 
one that divests itself of judgements regarding the beauty or utility of objects, and 
seeks only to observe and to reason. Since the interests of the theoretical man are 
empirical, critical, and rational, he is necessarily an intellectualist, frequently a 
scientist or philosopher. His chief aim in life is to order and systematize his 
knowledge (Allport et al., 1970, p. 4).
Once the participants had read all of the six category descriptions, they rated the 
individual importance of each of the six and then rank-ordered all of the categories by 
importance. The category that each participant indicated to be the most important was 
seen by Tesser and Cornell as an indication that that interest was highly self-relevant to 
the participant. A ten-item subscale of the interest category that was indicated by 
participants to be the most important was later used in the study as the affirmation.
Tesser and Cornell (1991) found that when participants affirmed themselves in a 
domain that was of high self-relevance, their global self-esteem appeared to be less 
adversely affected by the superior performance of another. This was not found, however, 
for those who affirmed themselves in a domain of low self-relevance. Based upon these 
findings, Tesser and Cornell have concluded that an injury to global self-esteem can be 
offset if one first affirms oneself in a domain that is of high self-relevance.
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Tesser and Cornell (1991), by making such a conclusion, suggest a 
fundamental assumption regarding self-esteem. In particular, they suggest that any injury 
to one’s self-esteem can be offset by an affirmation in any domain of high self-relevance. 
According to the domain-specific hypothesis proposed by Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999), 
however, this should not be the case. In particular, Kirkpatrick and Ellis would 
hypothesize that an injury in one domain could only be offset by an affirmation in the 
domain in which the injury occurred. For example, if  one were to have one’s self-esteem 
injured in the competitive domain of mate-selection, Kirkpatrick and Ellis would 
hypothesize that affirmation in a domain such as the cooperative coalitional domain 
should not offset the injury.
With Kirkpatrick and Ellis’s (1999) hypotheses in mind, one might ask how, if 
self-esteem is domain-specific, Tesser and Cornell (1991) could have found significant 
results without accounting for domain-specificity. This question is most easily addressed 
by first defining global self-esteem, the parameter investigated by Tesser and Cornell. 
From a domain-specific perspective, global self-esteem can be envisioned as an overall 
assessment of the current state of all of one’s individual domains of self-esteem (Even 
though this is highly conceptual, and global self-esteem might, more accurately, be 
assessing the overall current state of all active or currently salient domains of self-esteem 
(a discussion that is beyond the scope of this paper), I feel that it is presently sufficient to 
define global self-esteem as such). If one of the domains included in this overall 
assessment is injured, global self-esteem should decrease accordingly. This decrease, 
however, should not be to the same degree that would be seen if the injured domain could 
be directly assessed, because global self-esteem is an overall assessment of all domains of
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self-esteem, including those that were not injured (i.e. the negative effect of the injured 
domain on global self-esteem is buffered by the domains that have not been injured). If 
one were to have previously affirmed oneself in a domain that was different from that 
which was injured, however, the injured domain should not be affected by the 
affirmation, but self-esteem in the domain of the affirmation should increase. In response 
to the increase in self-esteem in the domain of affirmation, one’s global self-esteem 
should also increase; however, because the injured domain has not been affected by the 
affirmation, global self-esteem should still reflect the effects of the injured domain and 
therefore not increase to the degree that would be seen if there had been no injury. This 
might explain why Tesser and Cornell found significant results using global self-esteem, 
without taking domain-specificity into account.
It appears that Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) also share this conceptualization of 
global self-esteem. Expanding upon Leary et al.’s (1995b) fuel gauge metaphor, they 
believe that global self-esteem would be akin to a gauge that assessed overall engine 
functioning. This gauge would monitor all individual systems within the engine, and a 
problem with any one individual system would be indicated by a reaction in this engine 
gauge. However, an indication of a problem (by this gauge) would not make it overtly 
obvious (to the untrained eye) as to which system with which there actually was a 
problem. In addition, if one were to take his car to one who is trained to find the 
offending system, despite the indication of a problem with “overall engine functioning,” 
the system would have to be directly affected in order to rectify the engine trouble. Once 
this system was fixed, the indicator of overall engine functioning would also reflect the 
new, repaired functioning of this individual system.
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In Tesser and Cornell’s (1991) Study 1, the experimenters did not control for 
the domain in which participants’ affirmed themselves. Specifically, even though the 
affirmation domain was manipulated so that it was either of high or low self-relevance to 
each participant, the domain in which they affirmed themselves may or may not have 
been in a similar domain as that of the perceived rejection.1 Based upon the hypotheses of 
Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999), therefore, I hypothesize that the results of Tesser and 
Cornell’s Study 1 could be differently affected dependent upon both the domain in which 
one’s self-esteem is injured and the domain in which one affirms oneself.
The Current Experiment
The design of the current experiment represents an attempt to more fully test the 
hypothesis of domain-specificity, as recently proposed by Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999).
To begin with, this experiment was designed to both expand upon the research conducted 
by Leary et al. and improve upon the paradigm that Glenn (1998) recently used to 
demonstrate the domain-specificity of self-esteem. In addition to these goals, this 
experiment was also designed to expand upon research conducted by Tesser and Cornell 
(1991) in order to demonstrate the benefit that the domain-specificity hypothesis might 
bring to previous research on self-esteem.
In order to accomplish these goals, I concluded that the best approach would be to 
essentially combine aspects of the studies designed by Leary et al. (1995b), Glenn (1998), 
and Tesser and Cornell (1991). Because Glenn’s experiment may have been most flawed 
by not framing the perceived mate-selection rejection in a competitive paradigm, I first 
attempted to devise a method by which a mate-selection competitive paradigm could be 
introduced. It was important, however, that the competitive paradigm that was introduced
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not change the design of the experiment to a great degree from that used by both Leary 
et al- and Glenn, as one of the primary purposes of the current experiment was to 
demonstrate the differential effects (to their studies) that could be mediated by the 
application of the domain-specific hypothesis. I felt that the competitive situation used by 
Tesser and Cornell offered such a design.
Not only had Tesser and Cornell (1991) already demonstrated that their 
competitive design was effective, but it also allowed me to apply aspects of Leary et al.’s 
(1995b) and Glenn’s (1998) studies, along with the added benefit of demonstrating how 
past self-esteem research might benefit from the application of the domain-specific 
hypothesis. As has been previously mentioned, the results of Tesser and Cornell’s Study 
1 suggest that affirmation in a domain of high self-relevance can offset the effects of a 
perceived lost competition upon one’s global self-esteem. Expanding upon these findings, 
I hypothesized that, if self-esteem were domain-specific, the mate-selection self-esteem 
of participants who lost a perceived competition in the domain of mate-selection would 
only be offset by an affirmation in mate-selection (the same domain that would be 
monitoring the lost competition).
This hypothesis was made based upon a few assumptions. To begin with, it can be 
assumed that, for all persons, mate-selection is a domain of high self-relevance. This 
assumption is based primarily upon literature that have presented robust data that suggest 
that humans have a strong motivation to determine their relative mate-value (c.f. Kenrick, 
et al., 1993; Kirkpatrick & Ellis, 1999; Wright, 1994). Second, because Kirkpatrick and 
Ellis hypothesize that a mate-selection sociometer would only be sensitive to information 
that deals with mate-selection and derivation of mate-value, information that leads mate-
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selection self-esteem to be injured should only be able to be offset by information that 
would directly increase mate-selection self-esteem. Conversely, an injury to mate- 
selection self-esteem should not be able to be offset by affirmation (in a domain of high 
self-relevance) that is not in the domain of mate-selection.
I posited that these same results might also be found when assessing global self­
esteem (after one perceives a loss in a mate-selection competition). First, as previously 
mentioned, one could conceive of global self-esteem as an overall assessment of the 
current state of all of one’s individual domains of self-esteem. If mate-selection self­
esteem were injured, this injury is likely to be evidenced by a decrease in global self­
esteem, but not a decrease that would be comparable to the decrease evidenced 
(specifically) in mate-selection self-esteem. As was also previously mentioned, I 
hypothesize that an affirmation in mate-selection would lead to an increase in mate- 
selection self-esteem. Based upon this hypothesis, I therefore posit that this increase 
would be further indicated in global self-esteem, but not to the degree seen in mate- 
selection self-esteem. Up to this point, the effects that one would expect to see in global 
self-esteem are not very different from those that one would expect to see in mate- 
selection self-esteem.
Whereas one would not expect that an affirmation in a non-mate-selection domain 
of high self-relevance would affect mate-selection self-esteem, such an affirmation would 
be expected to affect global self-esteem. Following along with the conceptualization of 
global self-esteem as an overall assessment of one’s individual domains of self-esteem, 
an affirmation in a non-mate-selection domain of high self-relevance should positively 
affect some (other) domain of self-esteem, an effect that should be evidenced in global
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self-esteem. In support, Tesser and Cornell (1991) have previously demonstrated that 
affirmation in a domain of high self-relevance positively affects global self-esteem.
Therefore, in conclusion, the current experiment employs a perceived loss in a 
competitive domain that is assumed to be mate-selection. Based upon the hypotheses of 
Leary and Downs (1995) and Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) and also upon the 
experimental findings of Tesser and Cornell (1991), I designed the current experiment to 
examine the differential effects of mate-selection and non-mate-selection affirmations 
upon different measures of self-esteem.
Method
In the current experiment, affirmation was manipulated in a 2x2 between-subjects 
design. Participants were given the opportunity to affirm themselves in the mate-selection 
domain, in the coalitional domain, in both of these domains, or in neither of these 
domains. Two experimenters tested all participants. Each experimenter tested two 
participants at a time. Participants were randomly placed into conditions so that there was 
an equal chance that each experimenter would administer any of the four conditions.
Each experimenter tested roughly one-half of the participants.
Participants
The participants in this experiment were 69 male introductory psychology 
students from the College of William & Mary, ranging in age from 18 to 22 years old, 
who had earlier indicated on a mass-testing questionnaire that they were not currently 
involved in a heterosexual dating relationship. Participants were personally contacted and 
asked to participate in this experiment. All participants were required to complete 
research hours and therefore received course credit for their involvement.
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Selection Criteria
The criteria, which were used to select participants, were chosen because I 
hypothesized that participants with these characteristics would be best suited for the 
design of the experiment. First, I hypothesized that males would be more likely than 
females to interpret rejection by someone of the opposite sex in a mate-selection context. 
This hypothesis was based in part upon literature that implies that men are more likely to 
perceive interpersonal interactions with someone of the opposite sex in a mate-selection 
context (Buss, 1994). In particular, Buss has articulated the advantages (in terms of 
inclusive fitness) of short-term sexual relations (i.e. casual sex) for males; by so doing, 
males have the opportunity to produce more offspring. Because casual sex is generally 
advantageous for males, it is adaptive for males to be ready to reproduce as soon as the 
opportunity presents itself. For example, Buss has reported results from studies in which 
both men and women were asked how they would respond if someone of the opposite 
gender had approached them and asked them to have sex. In one of these studies, 100% 
of the women reported that they would emphatically decline. Of men, however, 75% 
reported that they would say yes.
Second, I thought that the perceived rejection would be more likely to affect the 
participants’ mate-selection self-esteem if the male participants were not currently in a 
heterosexual dating relationship. This second criterion was included because I concluded 
that, if a mate-selection sociometer functions to monitor mate-selection information, the 
nature of which may affect future mate-selection behavior and strategy, those who are not 
in a mating relationship would be especially attentive to stimuli that may help them to 
better establish their mate-value (consistent with Kirkpatrick and Ellis, 1999). It was
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assumed, therefore, that this criterion would further increase the effectiveness of the 
perceived rejection.
Student Participation
According to mass-testing data, which were collected roughly two months prior to 
the current experiment, and given my criteria, 107 students were eligible to participate. I 
first asked all 107 of these eligible students, via email, if they would like to participate in 
the current experiment. Once a reply was received from these eligible persons, they were 
contacted by phone to make an appointment for an experimental session. For those 
potential participants who did not respond to this initial email, an attempt was made to 
contact them by phone.
Following these initial attempts to contact potential participants, a further attempt 
was made to contact those with whom I had not yet spoken. Additional emails were sent 
and multiple phone calls were made to these persons. Of those persons with whom I was 
able to speak, 12 declined to participate. I was unable to get in touch with eight students. 
Of those students for whom I was able to schedule an experimental session, four did not 
show up, and four cancelled due to unforeseen conflicts. In addition to these persons who 
did not participate in the current experiment, data from six pilot participants (who were 
the first six participants tested) were not included. Thus, data from 69 participants were 
available for analysis.
Materials
Affirmation Materials
Mate-selection statements and paragraphs. As has been previously mentioned, the 
degree of desirability of each of one’s mate-characteristics is likely to vary. In addition to
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this individual variability, the characteristics that are perceived to be highly desirable 
in one male may not be perceived to be highly desirable in another, due to differences 
between males. Due to both individual and interpersonal variability, therefore, for any 
given male, certain characteristics indicative of mate-value will be prized for their 
perceived relative high value, whereas other characteristics will not be as prized due to 
their perceived relative low value. Because it can be inferred that a characteristic that is 
perceived to be of high value is also therefore highly self-relevant, I concluded that the 
best method by which to discover highly self-relevant aspects of mate-selection, in order 
to facilitate a mate-selection affirmation for any given male participant, was to allow 
them to rank-order a number of male mate-value characteristics in a fashion similar to 
that utilized by Tesser and Cornell (1991).
To enable participants to indicate their most valued characteristic of mate-value, I 
created a set of mate-value characteristics. This set was created so as to resemble the set 
of interest categories outlined in the Allport-Vemon Study of Values scale; it therefore 
does not represent a comprehensive list of all characteristics that have been suggested to 
be indicative of male mate-value. In order to create such a list, six characteristics that I 
thought to be the most important indicators of male mate-value were chosen. Those 
characteristics were: 1) Physical attractiveness, 2) Athleticism/physical prowess, 3) 
Intelligence/mental acumen, 4) Resource possession, 5) Considerateness/kindness, and 6) 
Resource potential. For presentation to participants, these characteristics were formatted 
in the form of a statement, in order to more easily elicit the degree to which participants 
valued each characteristic. Respectively, those statements were: 1)1 value my physical 
attractiveness, 2) I value my athleticism, 3) I value my intelligence, 4) I value that I have
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the means to purchase what I want, 4) I value that I am kind and considerate, and 5) I 
value that I am ambitious and hard working. As is evident in these statements, the 
resource possession and resource potential characteristics were tailored for presentation
•y.
in order to make them appear less scientific and more colloquial.
In addition to the six mate-selection statements, I also created a descriptive 
paragraph for each statement. These paragraphs were created for a few reasons. To begin 
with, they were constructed in an attempt to better replicate the design used by Tesser and 
Cornell (1991). Second, they were created to provide a more thorough depiction of the 
characteristic outlined in the statement, so as to clarify any inherent ambiguity. Lastly, 
each of these paragraphs contains attributes that I thought to be characteristic of someone 
who would indicate that the accompanying statement was their most valued of the six 
statements. This was done in an attempt to assure that the only people who chose a given 
statement as their most valued were those who actually perceived that characteristic to be 
highly valued in themselves, and not that they thought that that characteristic was highly 
valued by people in general. The following is an example of one of these paragraphs (see 
Appendix C for a comprehensive listing):
I value mv athleticism. People who are athletic have impressive physical skills 
and abilities. Because of these skills, such people usually excel in sports or other 
competitive physical activities and are therefore often recognized for their 
excellence. Due to their ability, athletic people seek out and enjoy participation in 
sports or other competitive physical activities.
As this example paragraph indicates, all of the paragraphs and statements were presented 
in a manner similar to that of those in the Allport-Vemon Study of Values scale, with the
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summary statement comprising the first sentence of the paragraph. Each statement was 
also underlined in an attempt to stress that the participant was deciding the degree to 
which he comparatively valued the statement. Finally, all six statements and their 
accompanying paragraphs were presented on a single sheet with instructions indicating 
that each participant was to rank-order the six paragraphs, where 1st equaled most valued
x L
and 6 equaled least valued.
Although the only purpose of this procedure was to discover the participants’ 
most valued mate-value characteristic, participants were nonetheless asked to rank-order 
all six of the statements. To begin with, this was done by Tesser and Cornell (1991), and 
doing so would keep the procedure of the current experiment similar to their procedure. 
Next, I thought that forcing participants to rank-order all of the statements forced them to 
read and evaluate all of the statements more carefully. This therefore may have lowered 
the possibility that a participant chose a statement without having assessed its value 
relative to the other possible choices, increasing the possibility that their choice for most 
valued statement was indeed their most valued mate-value characteristic. Finally, I 
thought that rank-ordering the statements would allow participants to more easily see the 
relative value of each of the statements.
Despite the advantages of having participants rank-order the statements, there 
were a few disadvantages to using this procedure. In particular, it was possible that 
forcing participants to rank-order the statements by value would have increased the 
difficulty of the task, because it was possible that multiple characteristics may have been 
deemed by the participants to be of equal or similar value. In addition, due to this issue, it 
was possible that participants would have spent an undue amount of time deciding the
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ordering of their least valued statements, the order of which was actually of no concern 
to the design of the current experiment. Even though these problems may have impeded 
the experiment, I decided that the positive benefits of the rank-ordering outweighed the 
potential negatives. Therefore, in an attempt to offset the potentially undesirable effects 
of rank-ordering, a paragraph was added to the instructions. This paragraph stressed that 
the participants might value all of the statements, and that choosing one to be more highly 
valued than the other did not indicate that they either disagreed with that statement or did 
not consider it to be of high value.
Coalitional statements and paragraphs. In order to afford one an affirmation in a 
non-mate-selection domain, six additional statements and paragraphs were employed.
The original intention was to utilize the six categories from the Allport-Vemon Study of 
Values scale. Unfortunately, upon further investigation and contemplation, I decided that 
many, if not all, of the dominant interests outlined in the Study of Values scale 
overlapped in some way with the mate-value characteristics that were chosen to afford 
one a mate-selection affirmation. I concluded, therefore, that using these interest 
categories might not afford one an affirmation in a non-mate-selection domain.
Based upon previous research (Williams, 1998) and Kirkpatrick and Ellis’s 
(1999) hypothesis that cooperative sociometers are fundamentally different from 
competitive sociometers, I decided to utilize coalitional self-esteem as the non-mate- 
selection domain. To do so, a set of six coalitional statements and paragraphs were 
created to afford participants an affirmation in the coalitional domain (in a manner 
similar to those created to afford an affirmation in mate-selection). I decided that the six 
coalitional statements and paragraphs would represent different types of coalitions. The
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initial objective was to use six characteristics that were indicative of one’s perceived 
coalitional-value, but many of these characteristics (such as dependability) appeared to 
have some overlap with the characteristics indicative of mate-value. In order to further 
separate these paragraphs from those that were used to afford the mate-selection 
affirmation, yet still provide participants with a choice of coalitionally related items that 
would be differentially valued, I chose to use types of coalitions. Six types of coalitions 
were chosen so that this selection procedure would be similar to that employed for the 
mate-selection affirmation, and therefore be similar to Tesser and Cornell’s (1991) 
original usage; the list is therefore not assumed to be exhaustive.
I decided to utilize what I hypothesized to be the six most important types of 
coalitions. The coalitions that were chosen were: 1) Same-sex friendships, 2) 
Clubs/organizations, 3) Ethnic heritage, 4) Family, 5) U.S. citizenship, and 6) Religious 
group. The statements that were created to inquire about the relative value of these types 
of coalitions were, respectively: 1)1 value my same-sex friendships, 2) I value the clubs 
and organizations in which I am involved, 3)1 value my ethnic heritage, 4) I value my 
family, 5) I value being a citizen of the United States, and 6) I value my religious group. 
An example of a paragraph that was constructed for one of these statements is (see 
Appendix D for a complete listing of all paragraphs used):
I value mv same-sex friendships. Friendship refers to the interpersonal 
relationships one has with other persons of the same sex (non-relatives). Someone 
who has a friendship has more than just an acquaintance. In particular, friends not 
only tend to spend time with each other, but they also support each other’s goals
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and causes. Due to the nature of this relationship, friends often feel a strong 
bond between them.
All six coalitional statements and their accompanying paragraphs were presented on a 
single sheet and contained the same instructions as those used for mate-selection.
Questions relating to the statements and paragraphs. In the experiments conducted 
by Tesser and Cornell (1991), the affirmation procedure depended upon the participant’s 
choice of most important Allport-Vemon interest category. Once the participant had 
indicated their most important interest category, those in the affirmation condition 
received a ten-item subscale of that Allport-Vemon category. Tesser and Cornell have 
proposed that responding to these items, which were related to one’s most important 
interest category, allowed participants to affirm that highly relevant interest. Following 
this logic, a set ten items was created for each mate-value characteristic (each set was 
assumed to be related to the mate-value characteristic for which it was created). In 
addition, a set of ten items was created for each of the types of coalitions (each set was 
assumed to be related to the coalitional type for which it was created).
Each set of ten items was constmcted so that all items in the set were directly 
related to the paragraph for which it was created. Specifically, I created each item in 
order to facilitate affirmation of each participant’s chosen most valued mate-value 
characteristic or most valued type of coalition. For example, one of the items that was 
created for the mate-value characteristic of physical attractiveness was: “I often get 
compliments on my physical appearance” (see Appendix E for all items created for all 
mate-value characteristics). One of the items that was created for the ethnic heritage 
coalition type was: “Being with people of the same ancestry or race as me makes me feel
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like I have a bond with a group of other people” (see Appendix F for all items created 
for all types of coalitions). A set of ten items was created for all mate-value 
characteristics and all types of coalitions so that a set would be available for all 
participants, regardless of their choice of most valued mate characteristic or coalition. In 
all, 120 items were created for this purpose (12 sets of 10 items each). Once I had created 
each of these sets of items, each was placed on a separate sheet in order to facilitate 
presentation to participants. In addition to the items, instructions were also included that 
asked participants to indicate, on a five-point Likert-type response scale, the degree to 
which they typically or generally agreed with each of the items.
Along with the construction of these ten-item sets, a set of ten filler items was 
also created. I created this set for the equal portion of participants who served as controls 
and therefore did not affirm themselves in either the mate-selection or coalitional 
domains. These filler items were constructed so that they were similar to the items that 
were created for the mate-selection and coalitional domains, insomuch that they were 
self-referent or inquired as to the participants’ opinions. In contrast to the other sets of 
items that were created, however, I intentionally constructed these items so that they were 
relatively unrelated to either the mate-selection or coalitional domains. One such filler 
item that was used is: “It is best for a college to offer as many majors as is possible” (see 
Appendix G for a list of all filler items used). The filler items were placed on a single 
sheet of paper in a manner similar to that used to present the other items, and therefore 
also included the same instructions used with the other items.
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Oral Presentation of Personal Information
To further enhance the illusion of perceived rejection, some oral response 
questions were also utilized. In particular, I hypothesized that orally responding to 
questions would enhance the perceived rejection in two ways. To begin with, these 
questions were self-referent, and I therefore thought that responding to them would 
further enhance the perception that one was rejected in lieu of someone else based upon 
personal characteristics that were known to the rejector (the perceived rejector will 
heretofore be referred to as Participant C). Second, I thought that responding to these 
questions orally would make the presence of Participant C seem more tangible, as 
compared to the perception that participants would have if they purely provided 
information for Participant C via paper and pen. Orally responding to self-referent 
questions has been used for these purposes in previous experiments (Glenn, 1998; Leary 
et al., 1995b; Leary et al., 1998).
Content of oral-response questions. The oral response questions that were used 
both came from and were based upon those used in Leary et al.’s (1995b) Study 4. All of 
the questions that were used in that study were not utilized in the current experiment, 
however, based upon the information that some of them requested that participants recall. 
In particular, a few of the questions requested that participants discuss some of their best 
and worst past experiences; one such question was: “What do you feel most proud of in 
your past and what do you feel most ashamed of?” I assumed that questions of this nature 
posed a conflict with the design of the current experiment. Because these questions asked 
participants to discuss some of their best moments (in some form), and because 
someone’s best moments are most likely to have occurred in a domain that was highly
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self-relevant, I concluded that answering questions such as these might enable 
participants to affirm themselves before the manipulated affirmation condition was 
introduced. To avoid this conflict, questions of this nature were not used.
After all of the conflicting questions that were used by Leary et al. (1995b) were 
removed, two questions remained. These two questions were employed in the current 
experiment. The first of these questions was: “What qualities in other people do you 
appreciate and what qualities do you find annoying?”; the second was: “What features do 
you most like and dislike about your mother and father?” In addition to these two 
questions, two additional questions were created. The first of these questions was: “What 
are your favorite and least-favorite classes this semester, and why?”; the second was: 
“Have you decided what your major will be? If so, why? If not, what are you 
considering?” I assumed that these questions, like the two questions used from Leary et 
al., did not request that participants recall, to a significant degree, any information that 
would conflict with the design of the current experiment. In addition, these questions 
were designed to inquire about information that I thought to be less personal than that 
inquired about by the two questions used from Leary et al. This was done so that the list 
of questions would start with those that inquired about less personal information and 
move into inquiries about more personal information (see Appendix H for the sheet that 
was given to participants).
The instructions that were included with these questions were adapted from those 
used by Leary et al. (1995b) and Glenn (1998). These instructions informed the 
participants to choose any question from the list and answer it orally into a microphone, 
as if they were having a face-to-face interaction with Participant C. They were told to
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answer the question for about five minutes, and to move on to another question if they 
ran out of things to say about their first choice. The answers that participants provided for 
these questions were not monitored, and were not explicitly used in any way in the 
current experiment.
Self-Esteem Scales
In this experiment, three measures of self-esteem were utilized as dependent 
variables. Of these three, two were designed to assess domains of self-esteem and one 
was designed to assess global self-esteem. The two measures designed to assess domains 
of self-esteem were created by me and have been used in previous studies (Williams, 
1998, 1999; Williams & Kirkpatrick, 1998).
The first of the two domain-specific measures, the mate-selection self-esteem 
scale, was used in the form in which it was most recently utilized (Williams & 
Kirkpatrick, 1998). This version of the mate-selection self-esteem scale consists of 
twelve items that I hypothesized to be related to mate-selection. One of these items was: 
“When I start a conversation with someone of the opposite sex whom I do not know, that 
person usually seems eager to talk to me.” (see Appendix A for a complete listing of all 
twelve items used).
The second of the two domain-specific measures was the coalitional self-esteem 
scale. This scale consists of eight items that I hypothesized to be related to coalitional
self-esteem. One of these items was: “When I go somewhere new, it doesn’t take me long
\
to develop a close-knit circle of friends.” (see Appendix B for a complete listing of all 
eight items used).
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The final measure that was used assessed global self-esteem and is known as 
the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). This scale has been used 
extensively in the literature and is assumed to assess general or global self-esteem (e.g. I 
feel like a person who has a number of good qualities; see Appendix I for a complete 
listing of all items). Responses to the ten items were made on a five point Likert-type 
scale.
Other Scales
In addition to the three self-esteem scales that were included in this experiment, a 
measure of self-concept clarity was also employed as a fourth dependent variable. 
Research has demonstrated a strong link between self-concept clarity and global self­
esteem (Baumgardner, 1990; Campbell, 1990; Campbell, Trapnell, Heine, Katz, Lavallee, 
& Lehman, 1996). In addition, the literature also suggests that self-concept clarity can 
also serve to affect the degree to which people are affected by external, self-relevant 
information (Baumgardner, 1990; Campbell, 1990). Due to the reported relationship 
between self-esteem and self-concept clarity, Campbell et al.’s (1996) Self-Concept 
Clarity (SCC) Scale was utilized as an additional dependent variable.
The SCC Scale is a twelve-item scale that assesses the degree to which one is 
certain about one’s own self-aspects or attributes. The instructions request participants to 
indicate the degree to which they agree with each of the items of the scale, using a five- 
point Likert-type scale for each item. An example of one of the items that was included 
within this scale is: “My beliefs about myself often conflict with one another” (see 
Appendix J for a full list of all 12 items used). This scale has been demonstrated to have
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high internal consistency (a  = .86), with an average item-total correlation of .54 
(Campbell et al., 1996).
Computer Administration
All three of the employed self-esteem scales were placed, along with the SCC 
Scale, within a computer program, in order to facilitate presentation to participants. The 
program was created using the MEL Professional authoring software, and was written so 
that it would be run in a DOS-based environment. This program allowed both the 
participants’ responses and response times to be recorded. IBM-compatible PC 
computers, with DOS installed, were employed for administration of this program.
The program began with an instruction screen that informed the participants that 
they would be indicating the degree to which they agreed with statements that would 
appear on upcoming screens. The instructions further informed the participants that they 
were to indicate their degree of agreement for each statement by pressing a number, from 
1 to 5, on the keyboard, where one equaled strongly disagree and five equaled strongly 
agree. Once participants left this screen, the next screen began the presentation of the 
self-esteem and SCC items. All self-esteem and SCC items were randomly presented 
without replacement; a total of 30 self-esteem items and 12 SCC items were therefore 
presented to each participant. When each statement appeared on the screen, a brief 
comment appeared underneath each statement that offered the participant a reminder that 
the scale was anchored so that one equaled strongly disagree and five equaled strongly 
agree. This brief comment appeared and was identical for all items that were presented.
Following the presentation of all of the self-esteem and SCC items, two additional 
questions were presented, each on its own screen. The first question that was presented
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asked, “Are you currently involved in a heterosexual dating relationship?” The screen 
contained the possible answers, and indicated that pressing the number one equaled “no” 
and number two equaled “yes.” The second question that was asked was: “If you 
answered yes to the last question, for how long have you been in this relationship?” Once 
again the screen contained the possible answers, and indicated that pressing the number 
one equaled “I answered no,” two equaled “ 1 - 3  weeks,” three equaled “1 -2  months,” 
four equaled “3 - 1 2  months,” and five equaled “More than 12 months.”
These last two questions were added in order to more accurately assess each 
participant’s dating status as of the actual date of the experiment. I concluded that this 
was necessary, given my hypothesis that the “not dating” criterion was important to the 
effectiveness of the perceived rejection. In particular, because each participant’s dating 
status was assessed via a mass-testing questionnaire that was administered about two 
months before the current experiment, I hypothesized that participants may have entered 
a heterosexual dating relationship since that time (and that this might therefore affect the 
results of the study). In addition, the second question (how long have you been in this 
relationship) allowed me to confirm the accuracy of the data collected in mass-testing; 
that is, this question allowed participants to report that they had been in a heterosexual 
dating relationship for a period longer than two months (the time since the mass-testing 
data were collected).
Experimental Environment
All experimental sessions were conducted in a social psychology laboratory. This 
laboratory had multiple, adjacent experimental rooms. This laboratory also had a waiting 
room that preceded entry into any of the subsequent experimental rooms. For this
54
experiment, three of the rooms were utilized, in addition to the initial waiting room.
The layout of the three experimental rooms was such that the middle room contained two 
two-way mirrors. Each of these mirrors allowed one located in this middle room to see 
into each of the two adjacent rooms, which were located on either side of this middle 
room.
The only experimental rooms that were explicitly used for participants were the 
two rooms that were located on either side of the middle experimental room. Situated in 
each of these rooms were a chair, a table, and a computer that sat upon the table. The 
lights in the middle room were dimmed so that the middle room was not visible through 
either of the two two-way mirrors that were located in these two adjacent experimental 
rooms. This was done in order to make it more believable that Participant C was located 
in the middle room and could see any given participant (without any participant being 
able to see Participant C). Also situated on the table in each of these two experimental 
rooms was a microphone. The cables from both of these two microphones were placed so 
that they ran from the microphones and went through holes in the walls that led into the 
middle room. This procedure was modeled after that used by Glenn (1998), and was done 
to give participants the perception that Participant C could conceivably be listening to 
their oral responses (via headphones) in the middle room.
Procedure
Score Derivation for Scales
The computer program, which was used to administer all of the scales, created a 
separate set of data for each participant, each of which was inserted into an electronic 
data file. The data for this study were extracted from these electronic data files. Once all
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of the data were acquired, the responses to certain items for each of the self-esteem 
scales and the SCC Scale were reverse-scored. Two total scores were then calculated for 
each self-esteem scale and for the SCC Scale. The first total score was calculated by 
computing the mean of each scale’s item-responses (this was done separately for each 
self-esteem scale and the SCC Scale). For the second total score, this same procedure was 
performed, for each self-esteem scale and the SCC Scale, except that each scale’s item- 
response times were used. Thus, three self-esteem scores and one SCC score were 
calculated using the responses and three self-esteem scores and one SCC score were 
calculated using the response times.
Experimental Procedure
Two male participants participated in each experimental session. The 
experimental session did not begin until both participants had arrived; therefore, if one 
participant arrived before the other, that participant was asked to wait until the last 
participant arrived. As each participant arrived, he was randomly assigned to one of four 
conditions: 1) mate-selection affirmation, 2) coalitional affirmation, 3) affirmation in 
both the mate-selection and the coalitional domains, and 4) no affirmation. Each 
participant was also arbitrarily given the label of “Participant A” or “Participant B.” As 
soon as both participants were present, the two together were told that the experiment 
involved the two of them and a third participant, Participant C, who had arrived earlier 
(in reality, there was no Participant C). Each participant was then taken into a separate 
room.
Once each participant was in his own room, he was told that the purpose of the 
first part of the experiment was for them to provide some personal information so that
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Participant C could decide with whom (of the two participants) to participate in the 
second part of the experiment. They were further informed that whomever was not 
chosen would participate in the second part of the experiment alone. Participants were 
then given two sheets o f paper. One of these sheets contained the six mate-selection 
statements and paragraphs, and the other contained the six coalitional statements and 
paragraphs. Participants then separately rank-ordered the six paragraphs on each sheet. 
Once completed, the experimenter collected these sheets from each participant, and 
informed the participants that he was going to deliver the sheets to Participant C for 
review.
When the experimenter returned, he asked each participant to respond to some 
self-referent questions into a microphone. The questions, which were listed on a single 
page, were given to each participant. They were next informed that Participant C was 
going to be listening to their responses, using headphones, in an adjacent room. The 
experimenter also informed each participant that the room in which Participant C was 
located allowed Participant C to see both him and the other participant by way of a two- 
way mirror (but that neither of the participants could see Participant C). At this time, the 
experimenter began to refer to Participant C using female-specific pronouns, in an 
attempt to subtly give each participant the perception that Participant C was female.
After about five minutes of oral responding, the experimenter asked each 
participant to stop responding to the questions. The experimenter then asked the 
participants to complete an additional questionnaire. This additional questionnaire 
represented the affirmation manipulation. The questionnaire that each participant 
received depended both upon his random assignment and his previous rank-ordering of
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the statements and paragraphs. For those in the mate-selection affirmation and 
coalitional affirmation conditions, the additional questionnaire was the ten-item scale that 
contained items related to the paragraph that those participants had earlier ranked as 1st 
(most valued). Those in the “both” affirmation condition, however, received two 
questionnaires, the ten-item questionnaire that contained items related to their most 
valued mate-selection statement and paragraph and the ten-item questionnaire that 
contained items that related to their most valued coalitional statement and paragraph. 
Those in the no-affirmation condition received the set of ten filler items that were not 
related to mate-selection or coalitions. Each participant was informed that, while he was 
completing this extra questionnaire, the other participant (either Participant A or B, 
depending upon assignment) would be completing his oral response questions (actually, 
both Participant A and B were run simultaneously).
Once the additional measure had been completed, each participant was informed 
that Participant C had made her decision, had not chosen to participate with him, and had 
instead chosen to participate with the other participant (either Participant A or B, 
depending upon assignment). After each participant was given this information, the 
experimenter informed him that, because he was to participate alone, his involvement in 
the study would take less time. The experimenter then proceeded to comment that his 
advisor had requested that, if the experiment was not going to take the entire period, the 
experimenter should collect some additional data for a separate study. The experimenter 
then commented that he would really like to get the other data collection out of the way 
as soon as possible, because his advisor would be disappointed if he failed to collect the 
data. The experimenter then asked each participant if he would mind doing this, and
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informed each participant that a small computer task was all that would encompass the 
extent of the information that he needed to collect for his advisor. The computer task that 
each participant then completed was actually the computer program that contained the 
mate-selection self-esteem scale, the coalitional self-esteem scale, the Rosenberg Self- 
Esteem Scale, and the SCC Scale.
Once each participant had completed these computer measures, he was debriefed 
as to the true nature of the experiment. In addition to this debriefing, each participant was 
assured that all participants had not been chosen to participate in the second part of the 
experiment, regardless of the information that each had provided. It was also thoroughly 
stressed that Participant C did not exist, and this was physically demonstrated to each 
participant. At this time, all participants were also asked other questions regarding the 
experiment. Specifically, participants were asked if they either knew or were suspicious 
of the true nature of the experiment. In addition, participants were queried to assure that 
they had thought that Participant C was female. Additional comments made by 
participants were also recorded. All participants were thanked for their participation.
Results
The purpose of the current experiment was to examine the differential effects of 
mate-selection and coalitional affirmations upon different measures of self-esteem. To do 
so, the primary analyses employed to analyze the data were 2x2 ANOVAs. The two 
independent variables were mate-selection affirmation (yes-no) and coalitional 
affirmation (yes-no). A separate 2x2 ANOVA was run for each of the four scales used as 
dependent variables: the mate-selection self-esteem scale, the coalitional self-esteem 
scale, the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, and the Self-Concept Clarity (SCC) Scale.
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Based upon the domain-specific hypotheses of Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999), I 
made a number of hypotheses for the current experiment. For my dependent variable of 
principal interest, the mate-selection self-esteem scale, I hypothesized that I would find a 
significant main effect of the mate-selection affirmation. I also hypothesized that, for this 
scale, I would neither find a main effect of coalitional affirmation nor an interaction 
between the affirmation types. These hypotheses were based on the assumption that only 
a mate-selection affirmation would affect mate-selection self-esteem.
For the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, I hypothesized that the findings would be 
different. I posited that there would be small main effects of both the mate-selection and 
coalitional affirmations on global self-esteem. I assumed, however, that the mate- 
selection affirmation would not increase global self-esteem to a degree as great as the 
mate-selection affirmation would increase mate-selection self-esteem. I also did not 
expect to find a significant interaction between affirmation types for the Rosenberg scale. 
These hypotheses were based upon a few assumptions. First, I assumed that, because the 
self-esteem injury was in the mate-selection domain, the mate-selection affirmation 
would serve to increase global self-esteem, by directly affecting mate-selection self­
esteem. But, because mate-selection self-esteem can be envisioned as only part of the 
overall self-esteem assessment represented by global self-esteem, I assumed that global 
self-esteem would not increase to a degree as great as mate-selection self-esteem. Second, 
I also assumed that, although the coalitional affirmation would not affect the mate- 
selection injury, it would increase coalitional self-esteem, and that this increase would be 
evidenced by an increase in global self-esteem.
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For the coalitional self-esteem scale, I hypothesized that there would be no 
main effect of mate-selection affirmation and no interaction. I predicted, however, that I 
might find a small main effect of the coalitional affirmation. These hypotheses were 
based upon a few assumptions. First, I assumed that an affirmation in the mate-selection 
domain would not affect coalitional self-esteem, which I have presumed to be a separate 
domain. Second, using this same reasoning, I assumed that coalitional self-esteem would 
not be significantly affected by the mate-selection injury incurred in the experiment. 
However, I assumed that the positive effects of the coalitional affirmation would serve to 
nonetheless increase coalitional self-esteem. I made no specific hypotheses for the SCC 
Scale, and included it in these analyses as an alternative method by which to assess self­
esteem.
Preliminary Analyses
Reliability
Reliability analyses were conducted on the data to test the internal consistency of 
all scales that were utilized. Alpha coefficients were found to be adequate for all scales 
employed. The mate-selection self-esteem scale had an alpha of .89, with item-total 
correlations ranging from .18 to .73. The coalitional self-esteem scale had an alpha of .73, 
with item-total correlations ranging from .19 to .59. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
had an alpha of .88, with item-total correlations ranging from .43 to .76. The Self- 
Concept Clarity Scale had an alpha of .87, with item-total correlations ranging from .32 
to .72.
For the mate-selection self-esteem scale, in addition to examining alpha 
coefficients, test-retest reliability was also assessed. This analysis was facilitated by using
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data collected via the mass-testing questionnaire that was administered roughly two 
months previous to the current experiment. All participants in the current experiment 
were administered this mass-testing questionnaire, which included the version of the 
mate-selection self-esteem scale that was employed in the current experiment. The mate- 
selection self-esteem of participants in the current experiment, as assessed during this 
mass-testing procedure, was found to be highly positively correlated with their mate- 
selection self-esteem as assessed in the current experiment, r = .79, p < .01.
Data Preparation
Following the tests of reliability, the data for certain participants were removed 
for all subsequent analyses. Seven participants, who had indicated earlier in a mass- 
testing questionnaire that they were not in a heterosexual dating relationship, indicated 
during the current experiment that their dating status had changed. Because these seven 
participants indicated that they had become involved in a heterosexual dating relationship 
since the mass-testing assessment, their data were removed. In addition, the data from 
three other participants were removed based on their comments during debriefing. The 
data for two or these participants were removed because they indicated that they did not 
think that “Participant C” was female. The data for one additional participant were 
removed because that participant indicated that he “knew” that there really was no 
Participant C. In total, data for ten participants were removed, leaving a final sample size 
of 59.
Correlations Among Dependent Variables
Correlations among the mate-selection self-esteem scale, coalitional self-esteem 
scale, Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, and Self-Concept Clarity Scale (SCC) were
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computed and are displayed in Table 1. Notably, the mate-selection self-esteem scale 
was found to be significantly correlated to the coalitional scale (r = .55, p < .01), the 
Rosenberg scale (r = .48, p < .01), and the SCC Scale (r = .44, p < .01).
The relationship between the mate-selection scale and the coalitional scale is 
similar to that found previously using the eight-item mate-selection scale (r = .54, p <
.01; Williams, 1998). This moderate, yet significant, relationship demonstrates that they 
assess a similar construct (self-esteem), yet are different enough to suggest that they
assess different aspects of self-esteem. The relationship between the mate-selection self-
/
esteem scale and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, however, is lower than that 
previously found using the eight-item version of the mate-selection scale (r = .63, p < .01; 
Williams, 1998). This decreased relationship may further suggest that the new, twelve- 
item version of the mate-selection scale more accurately assesses mate-selection self­
esteem.
Analyses of Response Variables 
Overall, the cell means appear to demonstrate a trend toward main effects on my 
dependent variables (see Table 2 and Table 3 for a list of all cell means). In order to more 
closely examine these possible effects, I began my two-way analyses with those 
examining the effects upon my dependent variable of primary interest, mate-selection 
self-esteem. Contrary to my predictions, the main effect of mate-selection affirmation on 
mate-selection self-esteem was not significant, F(l, 55) = 2.61 .05. In addition to this
disappointing finding, and not only contrary to but demonstrating an opposite pattern 
than that which I had predicted, a barely-significant main effect of coalitional affirmation 
on mate-selection self-esteem was found, F (l, 55) = 4.08, p < .05. As I expected, no
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interaction was found between mate-selection affirmation and coalitional affirmation,
F(l, 55) = 0.00, p > *05.
I next examined the effects of my independent variables upon coalitional self­
esteem. As I had predicted, a main effect of mate-selection affirmation upon coalitional 
self-esteem was not found, F(l, 55) = 0.04, p > .05. Contrary to my predictions, a main 
effect of coalitional affirmation upon coalitional self-esteem was also not found, F(l, 55) 
= 1.20, p > .05. Note, however, that the difference in coalitional self-esteem between 
having and not having a mate-selection affirmation was 0.03, whereas the difference 
between having and not having a coalitional affirmation was 0.16, a finding that is at 
least in the direction I had predicted. In particular, the estimated marginal means suggest 
that coalitional self-esteem increased more for those who affirmed in the coalitional 
domain (M = 3.86, SE = 0.10) compared to those who affirmed in mate-selection (M = 
3.79, SE = 0.11). This difference, however, is very small. Examining the effect sizes, 
however, revealed that the effects of the different affirmations were of different 
magnitudes. The effect of the mate-selection affirmation on coalitional self-esteem was 
nearly nonexistent, d = 0.05. The effect of the coalitional affirmation on coalitional self­
esteem, however, was larger and moderately sized, d = 0.28. No interaction between 
mate-selection affirmation and coalitional affirmation was found, F (l, 55) = 0.00, p > .05.
When I examined the effects of the independent variables upon global self­
esteem, as assessed by the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, no significant main effect of 
mate-selection affirmation on global self-esteem was found, F (l, 55) = 1.40, p > .05. In 
addition, no significant main effect of coalitional affirmation upon global self-esteem was 
found, F (l, 55) = 0.00, p > .05. These findings are contrary to my hypotheses. Note,
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however, that the difference in global self-esteem between having and not having a 
mate-selection affirmation was 0.20, whereas the difference between having and not 
having a coalitional affirmation was 0.01. These differences suggest that the mate- 
selection affirmation affected global self-esteem differently from the coalitional 
affirmation. In particular, the estimated marginal means suggest that global self-esteem 
increased more for those who affirmed in mate-selection (M = 4.04, SE = 0.12) compared 
to those who affirmed in the coalitional domain (M = 3.95, SE = 0.12). This difference, 
however, is very small. Examining the effect sizes, however, revealed that the effects of 
the different affirmations were of different magnitudes. The effect of the coalitional 
affirmation on global self-esteem was nearly nonexistent, d = 0.02. The effect of the 
mate-selection affirmation on global self-esteem, however, was larger and moderately 
sized, d = 0.31. No interaction was found between mate-selection affirmation and 
coalitional affirmation, F(l, 55) = 0.14, p > .05.
Neither a main effect of mate-selection affirmation, F(l, 55) = 1.66, p > .05, nor a 
main effect of coalitional affirmation, F(l, 55) = 1.09, p > .05, was found on self-concept 
clarity. No interaction between mate-selection affirmation and coalitional affirmation was 
found, F(l, 55) = 0.34, p > .05.
For each of my dependent variables, the overall trend in cell means appears to 
support Tesser and ComelTs (1991) suggestion that affirmation prior to a self-evaluative 
injury leads to increased self-esteem. For all scales, however, the greatest cell mean 
corresponded to affirmation in both the mate-selection and coalitional domains, 
suggesting that the two main effects are additive. It is also important to note that the 
mate-selection self-esteem scale appeared to show the greatest increases in self-esteem
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for those who affirmed, relative to those who did not. Although the means for the type 
of affirmation do not appear to be very different, this finding suggests that positive 
effects of any affirmation prior to an injury to mate-selection self-esteem may be best 
assessed by a measure of mate-selection self-esteem.
In addition to two-way analyses, three-way analyses were also run. For these 
analyses, a third, repeated-measures variable was introduced in order to examine the 
interactions between scale types and experimental conditions. The first of these analyses 
compared the mate-selection self-esteem scale and the coalitional scale. This analysis 
provided the most direct test of my hypothesis that having a mate-selection affirmation 
would increase mate-selection self-esteem to a much greater degree than it would 
increase coalitional self-esteem.
Contrary to these predictions, no significant main effects or interactions were 
found (see Table 4 for a complete listing of results), at an alpha level of .05. The 
interaction between scale type and mate-selection affirmation, however, demonstrated a 
trend towards that which I had predicted. This trend suggested that there was a slightly 
greater difference in self-esteem, between those who did and did not affirm in mate- 
selection, apparent for mate-selection self-esteem relative to coalitional self-esteem, F(l, 
55) = 2.43, p = .12. In particular, the estimated marginal means demonstrated that having 
a mate-selection affirmation increased mate-selection self-esteem, M ~ 3.22, SE = 0.12, 
relative to not having a mate-selection affirmation, M = 2.96, SE = 0.11. For coalitional 
self-esteem, however, this was not apparent, and the effects of the affirmation were 
nearly identical for those having a mate-selection affirmation, M = 3.79, SE = 0.11, and 
those not having a mate-selection affirmation, M = 3.76, SE = 0.10. The effect sizes
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illustrate that the effect of the mate-selection affirmation on coalitional self-esteem was 
nearly non-existent, d = 0.05. The effect of the mate-selection affirmation on mate- 
selection self-esteem, however, was larger and moderately sized, d = 0.42. The analyses 
also revealed a between-subjects main effect for coalitional affirmation that approached 
significance, F(l, 55) = 3.21, p = .08. This finding is not surprising, however, given the 
significant main effect of coalitional affirmation upon mate-selection self-esteem that was 
found previously in the two-way analysis.
The second of these analyses compared the mate-selection self-esteem scale and 
the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. I presumed that comparing these two scales was 
important because I hypothesized that a mate-selection affirmation would increase mate- 
selection self-esteem to a greater degree than it would increase global self-esteem. 
Contrary to this hypothesis, no significant main effects or interactions were found (see 
Table 5 for a complete listing of results). However, the interaction between scale type and 
coalitional affirmation approached significance, F(l, 55) = 3.55, p = .07, suggesting that a 
coalitional affirmation may differentially affect mate-selection and global self-esteem. In 
particular, the estimated marginal means demonstrated that having a coalitional 
affirmation increased mate-selection self-esteem, M = 3.26, SE = 0.11, relative to not 
having a coalitional affirmation, M = 2.93, SE = 0.11. For global self-esteem, however, 
this was not apparent, and the effects of the affirmation were nearly identical for those 
having a coalitional affirmation, M = 3.95, SE = 0.12, and those not having a coalitional 
affirmation, M = 3.94, SE = 0.12. The effect sizes further illustrate that the effect of the 
coalitional affirmation on global self-esteem was nearly non-existent, d = 0.02. The effect
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of the coalitional affirmation on mate-selection self-esteem, however, was larger and 
moderately sized, d = 0.52.
In addition to analyses of variance, analyses of covariance were also conducted.
In the first set of these analyses, the mate-selection self-esteem of participants, as earlier 
assessed during a mass-testing procedure, was used as the covariate. When this 
assessment of mate-selection self-esteem was included as a covariate in the two-way and 
three-way analyses, the results, for all dependent measures, were found to not be different 
than the original analyses of variance. Along with these analyses, additional analyses of 
covariance were conducted. When the Rosenberg Self-Esteem and Self-Concept Clarity 
scales were included as covariates in the two-way and three-way analyses using mate- 
selection and coalitional self-esteem as the dependent measures, the results were no 
different than those found using the original analyses of variance.
Analyses of Response Time Variables 
Previous research has suggested that, in addition to employing explicit responses, 
response latencies might also represent a method by which to assess self-esteem. In 
particular, Nezlek and Gable (1998) have reported evidence for a negative relationship 
between self-esteem and response latency; they found that, as self-esteem increases, 
response latencies to self-esteem items tend to decrease. If this assumption were true, I 
would make the same predictions for the current experiment using response latencies as 
dependent variables as I did for explicit responses.
No significant relationships were discovered between any of the scales that were 
employed in this experiment and their corresponding response times (n = 59). Three of 
these four correlations were, however, negative. The weakest of these was that
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demonstrated between the SCC Scale and its reaction times, r = -.06. A stronger 
negative relationship was found between the coalitional self-esteem scale and its reaction 
times, r = -.13. The strongest of these relationships was evidenced by that between the 
Rosenberg scale and its reaction times, r = -.22. The one positive relationship was found 
between the mate-selection self-esteem scale and its reaction times, r = .11. Overall, 
therefore, the correlations between explicit responses and their corresponding response 
times do not appear to support the findings of Nezlek and Gable (1998).
All of the intercorrelations between reaction times, however, were found to be 
significantly positively related, at an alpha of .01. The smallest of these significant 
relationships was found between the reaction times for the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
and the SCC Scale, r = .65. The largest of these significant relationships was found 
between the reaction times for the mate-selection self-esteem scale and the SCC Scale, r 
= .83. These strong, significant, positive relationships are to be expected, given that they 
are all measures of reaction times, and some people, on average, are likely to respond 
more quickly than others.
Despite the weak correlations between responses and response latencies, the same 
analyses of variance that were conducted using the response variables were conducted 
using the response time variables. These analyses were conducted for all scales that were 
utilized, at an alpha level of .05. None of the two-way analyses revealed any significant 
main effects or interactions for any of the scales used in this experiment. In addition, 
neither of the three-way analyses, in which I added scale type as a repeated-measures 
variable, demonstrated any significant main effects or interactions. This was true for both 
the analyses comparing the mate-selection self-esteem scale and the coalitional self­
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esteem scale and the analyses comparing the mate-selection self-esteem scale and the 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. These findings are not surprising, given the results of the 
correlational analyses, which indicated weak relationships between explicit responses and 
their corresponding reaction times.
Discussion
Unfortunately, the results did not support any of my hypotheses that predicted 
main effects or interactions. Due to this lack of support, I am unable to make any clear 
conclusions regarding the domain-specificity of self-esteem. In particular, the results of 
the current experiment failed to provide evidence for two fundamental assumptions of my 
hypotheses. First, the data did not indicate that a mate-selection self-esteem injury was 
best remedied by an affirmation in mate-selection, relative to an affirmation in the 
coalitional domain. This was most apparent in the non-significant main effect of mate- 
selection affirmation on mate-selection self-esteem. Out of all of the main effects that 
were predicted, I assumed that this would be the largest. In addition to not supporting this 
trend, the data actually indicated a significant main effect of coalitional affirmation upon 
mate-selection self-esteem, a finding that is opposite of that which I had predicted. 
Although this barely-significant finding could have been a result of chance, the data 
nonetheless did not support my prediction.
Second, the current results also did not indicate that type of affirmation, either 
mate-selection or coalitional, differentially affected, to a significant degree, the type of 
self-esteem that was assessed. For example, if this experiment had functioned to 
demonstrate the domain-specificity of self-esteem, one would have expected that the 
difference in self-esteem between those who had a mate-selection affirmation and did not
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have a mate-selection affirmation would have been larger for mate-selection self­
esteem relative to coalitional self-esteem. Even though the data demonstrated this trend, a 
significant interaction was not found. In addition to this non-significant interaction, 
results o f another interaction that approached significance actually suggested a trend 
opposite o f that which I had hypothesized. Specifically, the almost significant interaction 
between scale type, in this case the Rosenberg and the mate-selection self-esteem scales, 
and coalitional affirmation suggested that the difference in self-esteem between those 
who did and did not have a coalitional affirmation was greater for mate-selection self­
esteem relative to global self-esteem. If these data had supported my hypotheses of 
domain-specificity, the coalitional affirmation should not have differentially affected 
mate-selection self-esteem.
Potential Problems with the Current Hypotheses 
The results of the current experiment did not provide significant evidence for my 
predictions. It is possible that this lack of support is due to flaws in my hypotheses. In 
particular, as Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) have noted, it is not currently known how 
specific (or broad) any one domain of self-esteem might be. Although both Kirkpatrick 
and Ellis and results from data that I have previously collected suggest that mate- 
selection and coalitional self-esteem may represent two domains of self-esteem, this may 
not be the case. These conceptualizations of domains may be too broad (e.g. Kirkpatrick 
and Ellis have suggested that a competitive domain may be so specific as to be 
selectively attentive to information regarding physical attractiveness). These 
conceptualizations may also be too narrow (i.e. it may be possible that there are only two 
domain-specific sociometers, those for competitive and cooperative relationships).
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Despite these possibilities, I posit that the lack of support for the current hypotheses 
may be, to a greater degree, due to issues in the current experiment that were important 
enough to have seriously affected the current results.
Potential Problems with the Current Experiment 
Self-Esteem Assessment
Out of all possible issues that could have seriously affected the results of the 
current experiment, I presume that the means by which self-esteem was assessed may 
have been the most serious. In particular, I think that the scales that were employed, 
which assessed self-esteem via explicit responses that were provided by participants, are 
inherently unable to effectively assess any self-esteem injury that participants may have 
incurred, regardless of the domain in which that injury may have happened.
Implicit self-esteem. Previous research has supported this position, suggesting 
that more direct methods of self-esteem measurement may not be exceptionally effective 
at accurately measuring self-esteem (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Ziller et al., 1969). 
Greenwald and Banaji believe that this is because much of social behavior, including 
self-esteem, functions implicitly. Implicit self-esteem is “the introspectively unidentified 
effect of the self-attitude on evaluation of self-associated or self-disassociated objects” 
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Because this implicit self-esteem can not be assessed using 
explicit measures, Greenwald and Banaji suggest that the best assessment of self-esteem 
would entail the use of an implicit measure. Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998) 
have created such an implicit measurement system referred to as the Implicit Association 
Test (IAT). Greenwald et al. hypothesize that this computer-based measurement can be
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utilized to measure virtually any implicit association, including self-esteem (W. 
Cunningham, personal communication, December 1997).
Realizing that the current experiment may be affected by the purported 
inaccuracies of explicit measurement of self-esteem, I previously conducted two studies 
in order to assess two different methods by which to implicitly assess both global and 
domain-specific self-esteem. In the first of these studies, an IAT constructed by 
Greenwald was utilized (W. Cunningham, personal communication, March 1998) to 
assess global self-esteem. In addition to this global self-esteem IAT, I also created a 
mate-selection IAT and a coalitional IAT. Unfortunately, the results of this study 
suggested that none of these LATs were good measures of the self-esteem that they were 
created to assess (Williams, 1998).
In a second attempt to construct an implicit measure of self-esteem, I recently ran 
a second study (Williams & Kirkpatrick, 1998). This study was based upon results found 
by Nezlek and Gable (1998) that suggest that response latency is directly related to self­
esteem. In particular, they hypothesize that response latencies to self-esteem items 
decrease as self-esteem increases. With these results in mind, I created a computer 
program that assessed both one’s responses and response latencies to explicit self-esteem 
items. Mate-selection self-esteem items, coalitional self-esteem items, and global self­
esteem items were included (the global self-esteem items came from the Rosenberg Self- 
Esteem Scale). The results of this study indicated small, yet significant, negative 
relationships between the explicit responses to the coalitional self-esteem scale and its 
response latencies (r = -.27, p < .01) and between the explicit responses to the Rosenberg 
Self-Esteem Scale and its response latencies (r = -.35, p < .01). Significant relationships,
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however, were not found between response latencies and explicit responses for any of 
the mate-selection items. Due to these findings, I decided that this method by which to 
implicitly assess self-esteem was not more effective than explicit assessment. Because 
neither of these two studies produced results that suggested that these means of assessing 
implicit self-esteem were more effective than explicit measurement, I decided to employ 
explicit measures in the current experiment.
Other disadvantages of explicit assessment. In addition to the advantage of more 
accurately assessing self-esteem, utilizing implicit measures might also have controlled 
for two potential confounds. To begin with, an implicit measurement would have 
controlled for any desire a participant might have had to misrepresent his self-esteem by 
consciously choosing to not answer the explicit self-esteem questions truthfully. This 
would be true because, by definition, one who is completing an implicit measure should 
not be able to consciously adjust one’s implicit reactions or responses. Second, an 
implicit measure would have concealed the design of the current experiment. The nature 
of this experiment was such that participant knowledge of the purpose of the experiment 
could have confounded the results, insomuch that this knowledge could have served to 
buffer any self-esteem injury or otherwise caused participants to respond differently.
Thus, if the self-esteem assessment were implicit, it would be much less likely that one 
might be able to discern that which the experiment was designed to examine. Even 
though these two confounds appear to be similar, it is possible that one could have had a 
reason to misrepresent his self-esteem that did not relate to knowledge of the purposes of 
the experiment.
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Because the current experiment employed the use of explicit measures of self­
esteem, however, it is more likely that participants could have become aware of the true 
purposes or could have become suspicious of the purported purposes of the current 
experiment. In order to reduce this possibility, the experimenters stressed that the self­
esteem scales were for a different study, an assertion that was strengthened by the fact 
that these scales were included in a computer program, a medium of presentation that was 
novel relative to the other means of assessment utilized in the current experiment. Despite 
these attempts, although no participants indicated that they understood the real motives of 
the experiment upon witnessing the explicit self-esteem scales, many did indicate that the 
self-referent nature of the questions in the computer program led them to be mildly 
suspicious that the computer task was actually part of the current experiment. According 
to these participants, this belief further led them to be mildly suspicious of the design of 
the current experiment as a whole.
Because many participants indicated that they had become mildly suspicious of 
the nature of the current experiment upon witnessing the self-esteem scales, the manner 
in which they responded to the scales may have been affected. In particular, this 
suspicion may have caused them to be more aware of their responses and to therefore 
perhaps filter how they presented themselves. In addition, increased suspicion may have 
had the effect of weakening the impact of the perceived rejection.
Problems with the mate-selection self-esteem scale. Although past studies have 
suggested that the measure of mate-selection self-esteem that was employed in the 
current experiment is a good measure of mate-selection self-esteem, it nonetheless may 
not have been sensitive enough to have accurately assessed the impact of the perceived
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mate-selection rejection. This may be because many of the items in the mate-selection 
self-esteem scale referred to past events. One such item is: “I find that, after I go out on a 
date with someone of the opposite sex, that person wants to go out with me on a second 
date.” Another of these items is: “I do not regularly ‘date’ or ‘see’ people of the opposite 
sex.” Although I had thought, prior to the current experiment, that participants’ responses 
to self-esteem items of this nature may not be affected by a perceived rejection, I also 
thought that participants’ memory of such events may be affected by the perceived 
rejection, and that this effect might lead them to respond to items of this nature in a 
different manner. This, however, may have not been the case. Because many of the mate- 
selection self-esteem items referred to past events, the responses that participants 
provided for them may not have been affected by the perceived mate-selection rejection. 
The mate-selection self-esteem scale, therefore, may not have been sensitive enough to 
have accurately assessed the impact of the perceived mate-selection rejection.
Affirmation
Another issue that may have significantly contributed to the results of the current 
experiment regards the nature of the participants’ affirmations. For those who affirmed in 
mate-selection, each of the possible mate characteristics was chosen at least once by 
participants as their most valued mate characteristic. For those who affirmed in the 
coalitional domain, five out of the possible six types of coalitions were chosen at least 
once by participants as their most valued coalition. For both types of coalitions and mate- 
selection characteristics, however, participants’ choices were not evenly distributed 
among the chosen categories (see Table 6  for frequencies). For those who affirmed in 
mate-selection, 14 of 28 affirmations were for the characteristic “kind and considerate.”
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For those who affirmed in the coalitional domain, 21 of 30 affirmations were for the 
“family” coalition.
Reasons why the affirmation may not have had a significant effect. The 
affirmation may not have been found to significantly affect self-esteem primarily due to 
the fact that the design of the current experiment was different from the successful design 
of Tesser and Cornell (1991). First, Tesser and Cornell utilized Allport-Vemon interest 
categories as the basis for their affirmation manipulation. All affirmations in the current 
experiment were based upon mate-selection characteristics and coalitional types, the 
wording and description of which I created. This may have been a significant issue for a 
few reasons. To begin with, the Allport-Vemon interest categories may possess 
characteristics that are more conducive to successful affirmation. For example, the 
Allport-Vemon interest categories are more ambiguous and abstract, whereas the mate- 
selection characteristics and coalition types that I employed are very specific. The more 
abstract nature of the Allport-Vemon interest categories may have increased the positive 
effects of the affirmation because they may have, individually, affected multiple domains 
of self-esteem. The mate-selection characteristics and coalitional types that I employed, 
however, were specifically created to not affect multiple domains of self-esteem. Second, 
the variance in the degree to which participants valued each of the Allport-Vemon 
interest categories may have been greater than that for the mate-selection characteristics 
and coalition types that I utilized. This increased variance may have allowed participants 
to identify one interest category that was of significantly greater personal importance, 
relative to the other possible selections. As previously addressed, in the current 
experiment, I assumed that most participants would find, for both mate-selection and
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coalitions, all six statements to be of similar personal value. I had presumed, however, 
that participants would nonetheless be able to choose one statement, for both mate- 
selection and coalitions, that was highly valued. This may not have been the case.
Another reason why the affirmation may not have significantly affected self­
esteem may be that participants were able to indicate their most valued selection, but, for 
some reason, made a selection of lesser value. For example, even though I assumed that, 
for college students, resource potential might be more predictive of mate-value than 
resource possession, it was nonetheless surprising that only one person (who affirmed in 
mate-selection) chose resource possession as their most valued characteristic. This 
finding might indicate that the resource possession statement and paragraph were not 
worded in such a manner as to not appear narcissistic or socially undesirable. There may 
have been more persons for whom this was most valued, but they may have been 
dissuaded from selecting it because of the wording that was chosen for its description. 
Therefore, the wording that was chosen for all of the statements and paragraphs, for both 
mate-selection characteristics and coalition types, may have led participants to not choose 
a statement that was in fact their most valued.
Reasons why the affirmation did not have the effect that I hypothesized. The 
statements that participants chose as their most valued mate characteristic and coalition 
are important, given the probable overlap between the mate-selection and coalitional 
domains. Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999), in the context of discussing possible specificity 
and subsequent hierarchy of potential sociometers, address the issue of domain 
intercorrelation. In particular, they mention that some kinds of information, which affect 
one’s perceived value in one domain, may affect one’s perceived value in another
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domain. One example that they indicate is that of “kindness and trustworthiness,” 
which they hypothesize might be both valued by potential mates and coalition partners. 
This is an important issue, given that half of the mate-selection affirmations were for the 
characteristic kind and considerate. In addition to this characteristic, the other top mate 
characteristic choices, “hard working and ambitious” and “intelligence,” could also be 
seen as being highly prized in mates as well as coalition partners. Therefore, 24 of 28 
mate-selection affirmations may have had enough overlap with the coalitional domain to 
have not specifically affected mate-selection self-esteem.
This view of this particular domain overlap is echoed in a discussion of mate- 
selection (Buss, 1992). Buss hypothesizes that, in many ways, a mating relationship is 
similar to a two-person coalition. Specifically, he argues that a mating pair are essentially 
cooperating for a shared goal, successful reproduction and proliferation of offspring, and 
that their success is dependent upon the success of their cooperation. Buss would 
hypothesize, therefore, that, in addition to being competitive, as suggested by Kirkpatrick 
and Ellis (1999), mate-selection has a strong coalitional component, in which partners are 
chosen on the basis of their coalitional traits and potential cooperative compatibility.
From this perspective, kindness, in a mate-selection context, might not just be 
representative of a male’s willingness to impart resources, but might also relate to this 
potential mating coalition.
Notwithstanding this overlap, it is difficult to interpret the barely-significant main 
effect of coalitional affirmation on mate-selection self-esteem, especially given that the 
majority of those who had a coalitional affirmation chose to affirm with the family 
coalition. It is possible, however, that an affirmation for the family coalition cued
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memories and thoughts relating to how kind and considerate one had been to his 
family. Also, one would assume that a person who would choose family as his most 
valued coalition is likely to agree with and enjoy his family, so it is possible that his 
family had approved of and encouraged past dating relationships. As I have previously 
mentioned, however, it is also likely that this main effect was significant just due to 
chance.
Characteristics of the Sample
Sample size. A problem that may have seriously affected the results that were 
found was the size of the sample upon which analyses were conducted. As previously 
mentioned, the criteria that I had assumed would be important to the design of the current 
experiment limited the number of potential participants. In addition, a number of 
participants served as pilot participants, and the data for other participants were removed 
due to their dating status or comments that they made during debriefing. After the data 
for these participants had been removed, I was left with a final sample size of 59, which 
was divided among cells thusly: affirmation in both mate-selection and coalitional, n =
14, affirmation in mate-selection, n — 14, affirmation in coalitional, n = 16, no 
affirmation, n = 15.
The negative effects of this small sample size can be seen in calculations of the 
observed power of the analyses employed for this experiment. For the two-way analyses, 
the observed power of the tests of main effects and interactions for all dependent 
measures ranged from 0.05 to 0.51. The observed power of the significant main effect of 
coalitional affirmation on mate-selection self-esteem, which was contrary to my 
predictions, was 0.51. This indicates that, if the effect size demonstrated in my sample
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were reflective of the actual effect in the population, I would have about a 50% chance 
of finding it. The observed power of the three-way analyses that were employed in the 
current experiment was also limited. For the three-way analysis comparing the mate- 
selection self-esteem scale with the coalitional self-esteem scale, observed power for the 
main effects and interactions ranged from 0.05 to 0.42. For the three-way analysis 
comparing the mate-selection self-esteem scale with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, 
observed power for the main effects and interactions ranged from 0.05 to 0.46. My 
relatively small sample size, therefore, may have limited the statistical power of the 
analyses that were employed to find effects of the independent variables.
Possibility of selection bias. It is possible that certain characteristics of the sample 
used in the current experiment may have introduced biases that would limit the 
generalizability of any results or trends that were demonstrated. To begin with, the final 
sample only contained data from participants that were not in a heterosexual dating 
relationship. This characteristic of the sample may have led participants to have lower 
mate-selection self-esteem, even before the onset of the current experiment.
In order to examine this possibility, data collected roughly two months prior to the 
onset of the current experiment, via a mass-testing procedure, were analyzed (Williams & 
Kirkpatrick, 1998). All potential research participants, including those in the current 
experiment, had been required to complete a mass-testing questionnaire, which contained 
the mate-selection self-esteem scale. The mean mate-selection self-esteem, as assessed 
during this mass-testing procedure, of the 59 participants who participated in the current 
experiment was compared to the mean mate-selection self-esteem of those who did not 
participate. The first of these analyses revealed that the mate-selection self-esteem of
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those in the current experiment was significantly lower than that of persons who did 
not participate, t(472) = 2.14, p < .05. In addition, these analyses revealed that the mate- 
selection self-esteem of those in the current experiment was also significantly lower than 
that of males who did not participate, t(175) = 3.42, p < .01. The first of these results, 
which compared the current participants with all others who did not participate, reflects a 
moderate-sized effect, d = 0.32. The second, and more important analysis, which 
compared the current participants (who were all male) to males who did not participate in 
the current experiment, reflected a larger effect, d = 0.56. These sizeable effects, 
especially for that of the second analysis, suggest that the dating status of those in the , 
current experiment may have introduced a bias that led to the current sample having 
lower than average mate-selection self-esteem.
Another characteristic that may limit the generalizability of the results of the 
current experiment is the age of those who participated. All participants were college 
students ranging in age from 18 to 22 years. As previously mentioned, Buss (1994) 
believes that females are likely to use resource potential (i.e. ambitiousness and hard 
work) as an estimate of future resource possession when a male is too young to have 
acquired very many resources. However, it may be possible that the younger males who 
participated in the current experiment had yet to learn that resource potential was a 
desired mate characteristic. If this were true, participants may not have chosen “hard 
work and ambitiousness” as their most valued mate characteristic, despite that they may 
in fact have possessed those very traits. Therefore, using an older sample may have 
avoided this potential problem.
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Other Problems
An additional problem may have been the effect of the perceived rejection upon 
mate-selection self-esteem. I had assumed that the design of the current experiment was 
such that mate-selection self-esteem would be primarily affected by the rejection, as I 
thought that participants would view the rejection in a mate-selection context. Although 
many participants indicated in debriefing that they felt more affected by the rejection 
because they thought that “Participant C” was female, it may not have been salient 
enough to have seriously impacted their mate-selection self-esteem. The salience of this 
perceived rejection occurring in a mate-selection context may have been increased with 
specific alterations to the current design. For example, the possibility of affecting mate- 
selection self-esteem may have been increased if there actually was a sexually attractive, 
female Participant C. If both participants had met this female, the perceived mate- 
selection competition may have been more salient, and the perceived rejection may have 
been more likely to have affected mate-selection self-esteem.
Future Directions
Although analyses of the dependent variables did not indicate that the participants 
were affected in the ways in which I hypothesized, it must be stressed that, in post- 
experimental interviews, participants emphasized the effectiveness of the perceived 
rejection. In almost all cases, participants indicated that they had believed that 
“Participant C” really existed, and that Participant C had made the decision not to 
participate with them (the data for participants who did not make this indication were 
dropped from my analyses). Many participants indicated that this belief was most 
affected by the five-minute oral-response that they had made to this purported third
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participant. In addition, many participants also indicated that they had felt “rejected” or 
“disappointed” that they had not been selected. In many of these cases, participants 
indicated that this disappointment was due to their perception that Participant C was 
female and could see them during the experiment through a two-way mirror.
I hypothesize that a more accurate method by which to assess this effect, besides 
assessing implicit self-esteem, could involve coding practices. First, after participants are 
informed that Participant C did not choose to participate with them, maybe participants 
could be placed in some type of scenario in which they interacted with a novel person(s) 
of the opposite sex. This interaction might also occur in the context of other same-sex 
persons being available to interact with those same persons of the opposite sex. One 
might then code for submissive behaviors or avoidance of interaction with persons of the 
opposite sex. In addition to this condition, other participants who had been rejected by a 
perceived opposite sex person might be placed in an interaction scenario with only others 
o f the same sex, and these same behaviors might be recorded and compared with those 
persons interacting with opposite sex persons.
Second, another method might entail having participants write about a topic after 
they are informed that they have not been chosen. Rather than having participants write 
about specific topics, possibly one could ask them to write about their most salient dating 
experiences, or write about future dating experiences. After participants had written their 
responses, the responses could be coded for themes such as rejection and pessimism. In 
contrast to these writing exercises, other participants might be asked to write about 
significant memories or future predictions of behavior that do not deal with mate- 
selection. Therefore, based upon the responses of participants in the current experiment, a
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more effective method might be used to assess self-esteem without significantly 
changing the rejection paradigm. I hypothesize that such a method might entail a few 
different approaches, all of which would be constructed so as to keep the participants 
from realizing the nature of the experiment or the assessment.
Aspects of the Self-Concept
Some important issues for research investigating self-esteem or self-evaluation 
deal with one’s self-concepts. One’s self-concepts are thought to be composed of one’s 
self-aspects or self-attributes, each of which represents one’s knowledge of the self as 
represented by cognitive structures (Baumgardner, 1990; Linville, 1987). It has been 
suggested that self-concepts are a critical part of both one’s affective and cognitive 
system (Markus & Wurf, 1987). Due to their personal importance, research has suggested 
relationships between one’s self-concepts and numerous personality variables, most 
notably self-esteem (Baumgardner, 1990; Campbell, 1990; Campbell et al., 1996;
Linville, 1987; Showers, 1992).
It has been suggested that one essentially has two independent types of investment 
in one’s self-concepts: clarity and importance (Pelham, 1991). Of these two types of 
investment, the literature has suggested the strongest relationships between self-concept 
clarity and global self-esteem (Baumgardner, 1990; Campbell, 1990; Campbell et al., 
1996). According to Baumgardner (1990), self-concept clarity is concerned with one’s 
knowledge of whether one has a variety of trait attributes and, if present, the degree to 
which these trait attributes are possessed. The literature has suggested that lower levels of 
self-concept clarity are associated with lower global self-esteem (Baumgardner, 1990; 
Campbell, 1990; Campbell et al., 1996). It is thought that this relationship may be due to
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the increased perception of control over future events that is thought to accompany 
high self-concept clarity, thus propagating positive affect and increased global self­
esteem (Baumgardner, 1990). Because, conversely, it is thought that lower self-concept 
clarity is accompanied by a decreased sense of control over future events, it has been 
further hypothesized that people with lower self-concept clarity are therefore more 
influenced by external, self-relevant stimuli (Campbell, 1990).
In addition to self-concept clarity, self-concept complexity has also been 
investigated (Linville, 1987; Showers, 1992). Self-concept complexity has been 
operationalized as the number of self-aspects one possesses and the distinctions amongst 
these aspects (Linville, 1987; Showers, 1992). As with self-concept clarity, self-concept 
complexity has also been suggested to be related to global self-esteem. Linville (1987) 
has suggested that self-concept complexity acts as a moderator of the effects of stress, 
and increased self-concept complexity makes one less susceptible to depression and other 
stress-related symptoms. This is thought to occur due to the increased number of self­
aspects possessed by one with increased self-concept complexity. Therefore, if a self­
aspect is negatively affected, one with an increased number of self-aspects has a buffer 
against that negative effect, because the affected self-aspect composes a smaller 
proportion of one’s total self (Linville, 1987).
This view is mirrored by work done by Showers (1992), who refers to the 
compartmentalization of one’s self-aspects. Compartmentalization is similar to 
complexity in that one who has increased compartmentalization of self-aspects has a 
greater organization of one’s self-knowledge. It has been suggested that increased levels 
of this organization can aid one in protecting oneself from negative self-information.
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Both self-concept complexity and compartmentalization, therefore, have been 
suggested to engender one with a defense against negative self-information, protecting 
one’s overall view of the self.
Self-concept research suggests that characteristics of one’s self-concepts may 
affect the impact of negative self-referent information upon one’s self-esteem. Due to 
random assignment into conditions, however, it is unlikely that self-concept clarity, 
complexity, or compartmentalization significantly affected the results of the current 
experiment. It is possible, nonetheless, that these characteristics of the self-concept may 
have diluted any effects that may have been present. It would be interesting, for future 
research, to use the degree to which one possesses various self-concept characteristics 
(i.e. low-high) as an independent variable in order to more directly observe the effects of 
these characteristics.
Of particular interest, for future extension of the current experiment, are self- 
concept complexity and compartmentalization. It appears that these two attributes of the 
self-concept may be related to the hypotheses of domain-specificity posited by 
Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999). Specifically, the conceptualization of one possessing 
multiple, compartmentalized self-concepts appears to be akin to Kirkpatrick and Ellis’s 
hypotheses of multiple domains of self-esteem. Incorporating hypotheses of self-concept 
complexity and compartmentalization into future domain-specific self-esteem research, 
therefore, may further illuminate the functioning of self-esteem. For example, Kirkpatrick 
and Ellis have hypothesized that there may be two varieties of self-esteem, those for 
competitive and those for cooperative relationships. It might be possible that people 
differ in the degree to which their competitive self-concepts and cooperative self­
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concepts are both complex and compartmentalized. Possibly, if someone were to have 
a large number of both competitive and cooperative self-concepts (i.e. very complex), it 
might be more likely that there would be more crossover of self-concepts between the 
competitive and cooperative domains. Due to this increased crossover, one may be able 
to offset a self-evaluative injury by affirming in a domain other than the injured domain. 
This, however, might not be true for one with lower self-concept complexity, who may 
therefore have fewer crossovers between domains. The apparent similarities between 
self-concept complexity and compartmentalization with domain-specific hypotheses of 
self-esteem, therefore, may afford more accurate hypotheses regarding the functioning of 
self-esteem.
Conclusions
I designed this experiment in an attempt to provide some empirical evidence for 
Kirkpatrick and Ellis’s (1999) hypotheses regarding the domain-specific nature of self­
esteem. Unfortunately, the data did not support my predictions. Nonetheless, important 
issues were present in my experiment that may have seriously affected the nature of the 
results. Once these issues are addressed, I feel that the fundamental paradigm of my 
experiment has the potential to demonstrate support for the current hypotheses. I am 
confident in the foundation upon which the hypotheses presented by Kirkpatrick and Ellis 
(1999) have been based, and posit that these hypotheses have the potential to offer new 
and exciting insight into self-esteem processes.
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Footnotes
le s s e r  and Cornell (1991) do not explicitly state that they did not control for this 
possibility. They do not, however, mention that it was considered. I have inferred that 
they did not control for this possibility by comparing the interest categories from which 
the high and low self-relevance domains were chosen (for each participant) with the 
domain that may have been affected by the perceived superior performance of another.
To begin with, one can infer from the high relevance condition that the affected domain is 
likely to have something to do with intelligence (the domain associated with the low 
relevance condition is much less apparent). One of the possible interest categories that 
participants may have indicated to be of the highest self-relevance was called “The 
Theoretical.” The description offered for this interest category led me to postulate that it 
also was related to intelligence (see page 28 for a verbatim description of this category). 
Because Tesser and Cornell included an interest category, which participants could have 
chosen as their highest self-relevant interest, that was in the same domain as that which 
was affected by the self-evaluative injury, I have assumed that they did not control for the 
potential similarity of the two domains.
2This process was especially difficult for the resource possession characteristic, as 
I thought that, as originally worded, it had narcissistic overtones and might not be chosen 
to be a participant’s most valued characteristic, even if this were the case. I thought that 
using the statement “I value that I have the means to purchase what I want” to represent 
the resource possession characteristic retained an accurate depiction of the characteristic, 
yet presented it in a way that it would not appear to be unappealing to those who valued 
this characteristic.
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Table 1
Correlations Among Dependent Variables
Scale 1 2 3 4
(n = 59)
1. Mate-selection SE .55** .48** 4 4 **
2. Coalitional SE — .6 6 ** .63**
3. Rosenberg SE
4. Self-concept clarity
— yi**
Note. Mate-selection SE = Mate-selection self-esteem scale; Coalitional SE = Coalitional 
self-esteem scale; Rosenberg SE = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (1965); Self-concept 
clarity = Self-Concept Clarity Scale (1996).
** p < 0 . 0 1  (2 -tailed).
96
Table 2
Mean Scale Scores for Affirmation Conditions
Scale Condition n M
Mate-selection SE
Mate-selection affirmation -  No 
Coalitional affirmation -  No 15 2.80 (SD = 0.47)
Coalitional affirmation -Yes 16 3.13 (SD = 0.53)
Mate-selection affirmation -  Yes 
Coalitional affirmation -  No 14 3.07 (SD = 0.86)
Coalitional affirmation -  Yes 14 3.38 (SD = 0.55)
Coalitional SE
Mate-selection affirmation -  No
Coalitional affirmation -  No 15 3.68 (SD = 0.52)
Coalitional affirmation -Yes 16 3.84 (SD = 0.59)
Mate-selection affirmation -  Yes
Coalitional affirmation -  No 14 3.70 (SD = 0.54)
Coalitional affirmation -  Yes 14 3.88 (SD = 0.60)
Note. All scores fell within a range of 1 to 5. Higher scores are indicative of higher self­
esteem. SE = Self-esteem.
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Table 3
Mean Scale Scores for Affirmation Conditions (Continued)
Scale Condition n M
Rosenberg SE
Mate-selection affirmation -  No 
Coalitional affirmation -  No 15 3.87 (SD = 0.56)
Coalitional affirmation -Yes 16 3.82 (SD = 0.62)
Mate-selection affirmation -  Yes 
Coalitional affirmation -  No 14 4.01 (SD = 0.66)
Coalitional affirmation -  Yes 14 4.08 (SD = 0.71)
Self-concept clarity
Mate-selection affirmation -  No
Coalitional affirmation -  No 15 3.00 (SD = 0.76)
Coalitional affirmation -Yes 16 3.30 (SD = 0.61)
Mate-selection affirmation -  Yes
Coalitional affirmation -  No 14 3.34 (SD = 0.75)
Coalitional affirmation -  Yes 14 3.43 (SD = 0.68)
Note. All scores fell within a range of 1 to 5. Higher scores are indicative of higher self­
esteem or higher self-concept clarity, respectively. SE = Self-esteem.
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Table 4
Analysis of Variance for the Mate-Selection and Coalitional Self-Esteem Scales
Source df SS MS F E
Between subjects
Mate-selection affirmation (MSA) 1 0.61 0.61 1.13 .29
Coalitional affirmation (CA) 1 1.73 1.73 3.21 .08
MSA x CA 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Error 55 29.66 0.54
Within subjects
Scale (MS SE & C SE) 1 13.66 13.66 86.19 .00
Scale x MSA 1 0.39 0.39 2.43 .12
Scale x CA 1 0.19 0.19 1.20 .28
Scale x MSA x CA 1 0.00 0.00 0.01 .92
Error (Scale) 55 8.72 0.16
Note. MS SE = Mate-selection self-esteem scale; C SE = Coalitional self-esteem scale; a  
= .05.
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Table 5
Analysis of Variance for the Mate-Selection and Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scales
Source df SS MS F E
Between subjects
Mate-selection affirmation (MSA) 1 1.52 1.52 2.63 .11
Coalitional affirmation (CA) 1 0.81 0.81 1.40 .24
MSA x CA 1 0.02 0.02 0.04 .84
Error 55 31.85 0.58
Within subjects
Scale (MS SE & R SE) 1 21.27 21.27 103.59 .00
Scale x MSA 1 0.03 0.03 0.14 .71
Scale x CA 1 0.73 0.73 3.55 .07
Scale x MSA x CA 1 0.04 0.04 0.18 .67
Error (Scale) 55 11.29 0.20
Note. MS SE = Mate-selection self-esteem scale; R SE = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
(1965); a  = .05.
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Table 6
Frequencies of Most Valued Mate-Selection Characteristics and Coalition Types
Most valued selection f  Most valued selection f
Mate-selection Coalitional
Kind and considerate 14 Family 21
Hard working and ambitious 7 Religion 4
Intelligence 3 Clubs and organizations 2
Physical attractiveness 2 Same-sex friends 2
Athleticism 1 U. S. citizenship 1
Resource possession 1
Note. Resource possession is used to represent the statement: “I value that I have 
the means to purchase what I want.” Frequencies are presented in descending order. 
Selections depicted only represent choices for those participants who affirmed 
themselves.
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Appendix A
Mate-Selection Self-Esteem Scale (T 2-Item)
1. I sometimes wish I were more physically attractive.
2. Members of the opposite sex seem to like me.
3. , I feel as if no one of the opposite sex is 'out of my league'.
4. It surprises me when someone of the opposite sex shows interest in me.
5. I feel that the chances that I would date one of the most popular persons of the 
opposite sex on campus are very good.
6. In a social situation, I often find that persons of the opposite sex seem to act as if I'm 
not even there.
7. I find that, after I go out on a date with someone of the opposite sex, that person
wants to go out with me on a second date.
8. I do not find it easy to meet people of the opposite sex.
9. I often get compliments from people of the opposite sex, even when I don't think that 
I look especially good.
10.1 do not regularly 'date' or 'see' people of the opposite sex.
11. When I start a conversation with someone of the opposite sex whom I do not know, 
that person usually seems eager to talk to me.
12.1 often worry about what people of the opposite sex think about me.
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Appendix B
Coalitional Self-Esteem Scale
1. My partners on group projects believe that I have much to offer.
2. If I could find a fraternity or sorority that I wanted to be a part of, I doubt that I could 
get in.
3. I enjoy being involved in clubs, sports teams, or other organizations.
4. I often feel like it is me against the world.
5. When people I know do things as a group, I get invited to come along.
6. I often feel kind of'left out'.
7. When I go somewhere new, it doesn't take me long to develop a close-knit circle of 
friends.
8. I don't really feel very much a part of things here at college.
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Appendix C 
Mate-Selection Statements and Paragraphs
Please read the following underlined statements and their accompanying paragraphs. When you 
have finished, please order the six underlined statements by personal value by writing the number 
of the appropriate statement in the space near the desired order, where: 1st = most valued and 6th = 
least valued.
You will probably find that you strongly agree with many o f these statements, and that it is, in 
many cases, extremely difficult to rank one above the other. It is understood that just because you 
rank a categoiy below others does not mean you disagree with the statement or do not highly value 
what it describes.
Statement ranking:
|  s t. 2 n d - 3 rd* 4 * .  ^ t h .  ^ th .
1. I value mv physical attractiveness. Physical attractiveness refers to the degree to which someone else 
finds one's external, visible traits attractive or appealing. The quality o f any or all o f the following 
traits are often considered when assessing physical attractiveness: face, hair, complexion, muscular 
build, height, and overall appearance (i.e. well dressed, well kept). For people who are physically 
attractive, these traits are o f high quality; these people, therefore, regularly receive compliments or 
feedback from others regarding their attractive appearance.
2. I value mv athleticism. People who are athletic have impressive physical skills and abilities. Because 
o f these skills, such people usually excel in sports or other competitive physical activities and are 
therefore often recognized for their excellence. Due to their ability, athletic people seek out and enjoy 
participation in sports or other competitive physical activities.
3. I value mv intelligence. Intelligence refers to the degree to which one is able to solve problems and 
learn and understand complex or new material. People who are considered intelligent enjoy being 
involved in activities or professions that allow them to utilize and demonstrate their impressive 
thinking ability. These persons often receive high grades in school and/or are recognized in some 
fashion for superior knowledge or mental performance.
4. I value that I have the means to purchase what I want. Those who have the means to purchase what 
they want usually do not see cost as a barrier. Because o f this, such people often own and get to do lots 
o f really cool things. The things that they own are often highly desirable and expensive, and may 
include items such as cars, motorcycles, stereos, and other types o f interesting equipment. These 
people may also easily afford to do things such as attending concerts, eating out at restaurants, and 
traveling to other places.
5. I value that I am kind and considerate. Considerateness refers to the degree to which one demonstrates 
concern for the feelings o f another person. Considerate people are thoughtful and think o f other people 
in addition to themselves. Such persons care about what happens to others, and often risk personal loss 
or incur personal expense in order to secure good fortune for another.
6. I value that I am ambitious and hard working. Someone who is ambitious and hard working has plans 
for the future. In particular, such a person believes that effort expended in the present will lead to 
future accomplishments. One may not see immediate results o f  such effort, but often the 
accomplishments one eventually receives are extremely beneficial.
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Appendix D 
Coalitional Statements and Paragraphs
Please read the following underlined statements and their accompanying paragraphs. When you have 
finished, please order the six underlined statements by personal value by writing the number of the 
appropriate statement in the space near the desired order, where: 1st = most valued and 6th = least 
valued.
You will probably find that you strongly agree with many of these statements, and that it is, in many 
cases, extremely difficult to rank one above the other. It is understood that just because you rank a 
category below others does not mean you disagree with the statement or do not highly value what it 
describes.
Statement ranking:
I st. 2nd- 3rd- 4dl> 5 th-
1. I value mv same-sex friendships. Friendship refers to the interpersonal relationships one has with other 
persons of the same sex (non-relatives). Someone who has a friendship has more than just an acquaintance. 
In particular, friends not only tend to spend time with each other, but they also support each other’s goals 
and causes. Due to the nature of this relationship, friends often feel a strong bond between them.
2. I value the clubs and organizations in which I am involved. ‘Clubs’ and ‘organizations’ are two broad 
descriptors that may include many different specific examples, such as fraternities or sororities (but not sport 
teams). Despite their potential diversity, these specific examples do, however, share some common 
characteristics. In particular, ‘clubs’ and ‘organizations’ are composed of groups of people, were created for 
some common purpose or interest, and usually require that a potential member in some way ‘join’ the group.
3. I value mv ethnic heritage. Ethnic heritage is a term that refers to one’s race or ancestral background, yet not 
always to a specific nationality. It is assumed that, by using this definition, everyone has an ethnic heritage. 
People o f different ethnic heritages usually have their own specific customs and practices. These ways are 
usually highly prized and are often recognized only by those of the same ethnic heritage. Because of their 
unique characteristics, people of the same ethnic heritage often feel a common attachment among them.
4. I value mv family. Most people are raised as part of a family, which is typically composed of relatives such 
as parents, siblings, grandparents, and aunts and uncles. In many cases, however, one’s family may consist 
of people to whom one is not related. Regardless of their nature, families are usually very supportive and 
loving. There is often a strong bond among family members, and people therefore usually feel very secure 
with their family around. Because of these emotions, people often go out of their way to be in contact with 
their family.
5. I value being a citizen of the United States. Those who value their U.S. citizenship feel great pride in their 
country. They usually cannot imagine living anywhere else, and find pleasure in their personal freedom and 
all that is distinctly ‘American.’ All things considered, therefore, these types of people feel that the U.S. is 
the best country in which to live and be a citizen.
6. I value mv religious group. Many people are part of or participate in the activities of a given religious group. 
Religions can be very diverse and numerous, but nonetheless tend to focus around some central faith or 
method of worship. Religious people often receive spiritual satisfaction and pleasure from practicing their 
religion, and usually do so within a community of other believers. Those who value their religious group, 
therefore, enjoy the personal enlightenment and social unity that their religion has to offer.
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Appendix E 
Items Relating to Mate-Value Characteristics
Appendix E 1. Items corresponding to the statement: “I value my physical 
attractiveness.”
Appendix E2. Items corresponding to the statement: “I value my athleticism.” 
Appendix E3. Items corresponding to the statement: “I value my intelligence.” 
Appendix E4. Items corresponding to the statement: “I value that I have the 
means to purchase what I want.”
Appendix E5. Items corresponding to the statement: “I value that I am kind and 
considerate.”
Appendix E6. Items corresponding to the statement: “I value that I am ambitious 
and hard working.”
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Appendix E 1
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4
= agree, and 5= strongly agree.
I often get compliments on my physical appearance.................................. 1......2........3...... 4......5
Attractive people simply have more opportunities
than other people. 1......2........3...... 4......5
People are often impressed by my good looks. 1......2........3...... 4..... 5
Ultimately, it all comes down to one’s physical appearance. 1......2........3...... 4..... 5
I often catch people admiring the way that I look. 1......2........3...... 4..... 5
If two people of equal qualifications applied for the same job,
it is more likely that the better looking of the two will get the job. 1......2........3...... 4..... 5
The fact that I am good-looking leads others to have
a better opinion of me. 1......2........3...... 4..... 5
Good-looking people, overall, usually have
better qualities than others. 1......2........3...... 4..... 5
My physical appearance has gained me popularity. 1......2........3...... 4..... 5
All things being equal, I am most pleased when I am
recognized for my physical appearance. 1.......2.......3......4...... 5
MS/PA
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Appendix E2
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4
= agree, and 5= strongly agree.
I feel an incredible sense of accomplishment when I surpass
someone else in a competitive physical activity.........................................1.......2...... 3...... 4.......5
Developing one’s physical abilities is just as important
as developing one’s intellect. 1.......2......3.......4..... 5
Athletic people, overall, usually have better qualities than others. 1.......2......3.......4..... 5
Demonstrating my physical skills can lead others
to have a better opinion of me. 1.......2......3.......4..... 5
I would most prefer to spend my leisure time participating
in competitive physical activity. 1.......2......3.......4..... 5
There are few things more pleasurable than
winning a sporting event. 1.......2......3.......4..... 5
I feel that my athletic skill is better than
that of the average athlete. 1.......2......3.......4..... 5
When playing as part of a team, my teammates often look
to me to make major contributions towards winning. 1.......2......3.......4..... 5
When I try a new sport or physical activity, I can
usually excel at it quite quickly. 1.......2......3.......4..... 5
All things being equal, I am most pleased when I am
recognized for my physical ability. 1.......2......3.......4.....5
MS/A
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Appendix E3
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4
= agree, and 5= strongly agree.
When having a discussion with my same-sex friends, I often 
find that I am most interested in discussing topics that
are deep and require a lot of thought..........................................................1.......2...... 3...... 4.......5
It feels good to know a professor is impressed
with my thinking ability. 1......2...... 3.......4..... 5
Demonstrating my intellectual ability often leads others
to have a better opinion of me. 1......2...... 3.......4..... 5
Smart and creative people compose the foundation
of society’s greatest achievements. 1......2...... 3.......4..... 5
The grades that one receives in school are a good
indicator of one’s overall worth. 1 ......2...... 3.......4..... 5
If two people applied for the same job, all other things 
being equal, the applicant with the highest grades
and/or test scores should get the job. 1.......2...... 3......4...... 5
I generally enjoy learning new and exciting topics. 1.......2...... 3......4...... 5
All things being equal, I am most pleased when I am
recognized for my intelligence. 1......2...... 3.......4..... 5
Nothing is quite as gratifying as solving some
complex or challenging problem. 1.......2...... 3......4......5
It’s enjoyable to have an intellectual argument with someone
and to have therefore changed the way that they look at a topic. 1.......2...... 3......4......5
MS/I
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Appendix E4
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4
= agree, and 5= strongly agree.
I like the way it feels when I buy new and interesting things. 1......2...... 3.......4..... 5
If I were really rich, I would truly be a part of the world’s elite. 1...... 2...... 3.......4..... 5
I’m glad that, if I want to do something cool or interesting, I
don’t have to be concerned with how much it costs................................... 1.......2...... 3......4...... 5
Some of my more pleasurable feelings involve my possession
of expensive items and other things. 1......2...... 3.......4..... 5
Spending money often leads others to have a better opinion of me. 1...... 2...... 3.......4..... 5
I feel that the quality of one’s possessions serves as a more
accurate measure of one’s personal worth. 1.......2...... 3......4......5
The only good jobs are those that pay really well. 1.......2...... 3......4......5
People are impressed by the things that I own. 1.......2...... 3......4..... .5
It’s reassuring to know that, if I so desired, I could
afford the expense of travel. 1.......2...... 3......4......5
Wealthy people compose the foundation of
society’s greatest achievements. 1.......2...... 3......4......5
MS/RP
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Appendix E5
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4
= agree, and 5= strongly agree.
It often feels good to put someone else’s interests before my own.............. 1....... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5
The most important personal motivation is the
demonstration of concern for others...........................................................1....... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5
Some of my greatest joy comes from making other people happy..............1....... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5
You can tell a lot about someone by noticing
how they treat other people. 1....... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5
People are often impressed by how considerate I am. 1....... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5
The best people are those who would take
risks on the behalf of others. 1....... 2...... 3...... 4.....5
Those with a humanitarian nature compose the
foundation of society’s greatest achievements. 1....... 2...... 3...... 4.....5
It feels good to compliment people whenever I can. 1....... 2...... 3...... 4.....5
I often find that, when I am shopping for myself, I often think
about buying something for someone else that I know. 1....... 2...... 3......A .....5
People really appreciate it when I show them that I really care. 1....... 2...... 3...... 4.....5
MS/KC
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Appendix E6
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4
= agree, and 5= strongly agree.
Those who put in the most effort reap the greatest benefits........................ 1...... 2...... 3...... 4...... 5
People are impressed by how hard I work.................................................. 1...... 2...... 3..... .4.......5
It feels good to put a lot of effort into a project...........................................1...... 2...... 3...... 4......5
Hard work and perseverance will pay off in the future............................... 1...... 2...... 3...... 4......5
Demonstrating my perseverance to succeed often
leads others to have a better opinion of me................................................. 1...... 2...... 3...... 4......5
Hard working people compose the foundation of
society’s greatest achievements.................................................................. 1...... 2...... 3...... 4......5
If two employees with similar achievements were 
up for the same promotion, the employee that works
the hardest should be the one to get it. 1...... 2...... 3...... 4......5
Achievement feels much more rewarding when
you work hard for it. 1...... 2...... 3...... 4......5
Noting how hard one works can more accurately
assess one’s true nature. 1...... 2...... 3...... 4......5
It is very satisfying to be motivated to succeed. 1...... 2...... 3...... 4......5
MS/HW
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Appendix F 
Items Relating to Types of Coalitions
Appendix F 1. Items corresponding to the statement: “I value my same-sex 
friendships.”
Appendix F2. Items corresponding to the statement: “I value the clubs and 
organizations in which I am involved.”
Appendix F3. Items corresponding to the statement: “I value my ethnic heritage.” 
Appendix F4. Items corresponding to the statement “I value my family.”
Appendix F5. Items corresponding to the statement: “I value being a citizen of the 
United States.”
Appendix F6 . Items corresponding to the statement: “I value my religious group.”
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Appendix F 1
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4
= agree, and 5= strongly agree.
You can always count on your best friend. 1...... 2......3.......4..... 5
I find that I don’t have as much fun when my
good friends aren’t around. 1...... 2...... 3.......4..... 5
In a good friendship, you often let things slide by
that might otherwise be a problem............................................................ 1....... 2..... 3....... 4..... 5
My friends and I look out for each other’s best interests............................ 1....... 2..... 3....... 4..... 5
I have some of the best conversations with my friends...............................1.......2..... 3....... 4..... 5
When I am with a friend or friends, I feel
very comfortable and secure. 1....... 2..... 3....... 4..... 5
I can entrust my friends with personal secrets. 1....... 2..... 3....... 4..... 5
My friends and I have many of the same interests. 1....... 2..... 3....... 4.....5
My good friends accept me for who I am. 1....... 2..... 3....... 4.....5
My good friends are eager to hear my problems and
to help out the best that they can. 1 ....... 2 ..... 3 ....... 4 .....5
C/SSF
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Appendix F2
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4
= agree, and 5= strongly agree.
I like it that most of the people in the clubs and organizations in
which I am involved are in some way similar to me...................................1......2...... 3.......4.......5
It feels good when I make a contribution to my club or
organization that positively affects the whole group...................................1.......2...... 3...... 4......5
You can tell a lot about a person by assessing their
involvement in extracurricular organizations..............................................1.......2...... 3......4......5
Being involved in my clubs and organizations makes me
feel like I have a bond with a group of other people................................... 1.......2...... 3......4......5
Some of the most motivated people are those who choose to put
in the effort to be involved with others to accomplish some goal. 1 .......2........3...... 4......5
I feel much more complete when I can participate in an
activity with a group of like-minded people. 1.......2...... 3......4..... 5
My involvement in clubs and organizations is a great way to gain
solid experience in order to prepare me for the working world. 1.......2......3......4..... 5
Being involved in my clubs and organizations makes me feel
that my interests are good interests. 1.......2...... 3......4..... 5
I often feel that I can best relate to people in clubs
and organizations to which I belong. 1.......2......3......4..... 5
I am proud of my clubs and organizations. 1.......2......3......4..... 5
C/CO
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Appendix F3
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4
= agree, and 5= strongly agree.
I am proud of my ethnic heritage................................................................1.......2...... 3......4......5
I often feel that I can best relate to people
of my ethnic background............................................................................1...... .2...... 3......4..... 5
Being with people of the same ancestry or race as me makes
me feel like I have a bond with a group of other people............................. 1.......2...... 3......4..... 5
It feels good when I make a contribution that positively
affects people in my ethnic group...............................................................1.......2...... 3......4..... 5
I like it that many people of my ancestral heritage
have interests that are similar to mine. 1.......2...... 3......4..... 5
I feel special when I am involved in activities or
customs that are specific to my ethnic heritage. 1.......2...... 3......4..... 5
I enjoy recognizing events or holidays that are
specific to my ancestry or race. 1.......2...... 3......4..... 5
I feel that I have a bond with people of my ethnic heritage,
even though I may not know who they are. 1.......2...... 3......4..... 5
Researching and finding out more information about my
ancestry makes me feel good about myself. 1.......2...... 3......4..... 5
I feel proud when someone of my race or ancestral
background achieves great things. 1.......2...... 3...... 4..... 5
C/EH
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Appendix F4
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4
= agree, and 5= strongly agree.
You can always count on your family........................................................ 1...... 2...... 3...... 4......5
Being around my family makes me feel very good.....................................1...... 2...... 3...... 4......5
My family accepts me for who I am.......................................................... 1...... 2...... 3...... 4.......5
I feel a strong bond with people in my family............................................ 1...... 2...... 3...... 4......5
People in my family really care about me and my interests. 1...... 2...... 3...... 4......5
I enjoy those times when many of the people in my family
get together to meet in the same place. 1...... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5
People in my family are eager to hear my problems
and to help out the best that they can. 1...... 2.......3...... 4..... 5
In my family are some of the only people
who really know who I am. 1...... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5
One’s family contains the only people that someone can
really expect to always be there in times of need. 1...... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5
My family is composed of a group of people
who really want me in their lives. 1...... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5
C/F
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Appendix F5
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4
= agree, and 5= strongly agree.
The United States offers someone more opportunities
than any other country................................................................................ 1......2......3.......4......5
I feel a common bond with other U.S. citizens............................................1......2......3.......4......5
I really value the freedom that living in the U.S. offers me.........................1......2......3.......4......5
Anyone in this country can choose to be whatever they want to be.............1......2......3.......4......5
I cannot see myself living anywhere else but in the United States...............1......2......3.......4......5
I am proud to live in the United States. 1......2......3.......4..... 5
This country, in general, is a positive role
model for other countries. 1......2...... 3.......4..... 5
The U.S. is the best country on earth. 1 ......2......3.......4..... 5
I enjoy the way of life here in the United States. 1......2...... 3.......4..... 5
I feel that the U.S. does and has the potential to do
great things for the world at large. 1......2......3.......4..... 5
C/US
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Appendix F6
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4
= agree, and 5= strongly agree.
Practicing my religion makes me feel good
about myself and life in general..................................................................1.......2...... 3......4......5
I feel that I have a common bond with many of
the people who practice my religion........................................................... 1.......2...... 3......4......5
I often feel compelled to contribute to my religious group
because of all it has provided for me.......................................................... 1......2...... 3.......4......5
My religious group makes me feel secure...................................................1......2...... 3.......4......5
Being a part of a religious group entails more than attending
an occasion meeting or time of worship......................................................1...... 2...... 3.......4......5
My religion offers me enough satisfaction that I 
sometimes feel compelled to tell other people
(who are not part of my religion) about it. 1...... 2......3.......4..... 5
I enjoy getting together with others of my faith
to discuss and practice my religion. 1......2......3.......4..... 5
I feel as if my religious group cares about my welfare. 1...... 2......3.......4..... 5
If more people practiced my religion, the
world would be a better place. 1......2...... 3.......4..... 5
Truly religious people should have an active role
in their church or religious group. 1......2...... 3.......4..... 5
C/R
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Appendix G
Filler Items
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4
= agree, and 5= strongly agree.
It is best for a college to offer as many majors as is possible...................... 1.......2......3......4......5
I enjoy eating a variety of foods................................................................. 1.......2......3......4......5
It should be up to the students to dictate the time at
which classes should be held...................................................................... 1.......2...... 3......4......5
I generally enjoy the weather more when the
temperature is higher. 1......2......3.......4......5
Sometimes I like to walk to places to which I
would usually drive. 1......2......3.......4......5
When new cars are marketed for sale, one should be able
to choose from a variety of colors. 1......2......3.......4..... 5
Making classrooms more comfortable for students should
be a college’s top priority. 1......2......3.......4..... 5
I enjoy the way that coffee tastes. 1......2......3.......4..... 5
Wood furniture is better than furniture made
out of other materials. 1......2......3.......4..... 5
When I study, I like to be in a really brightly-lit room. 1......2......3.......4..... 5
F
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Appendix H
During this part of the study, you will interact with a participant (Participant C) by 
talking into a microphone. The purpose of this interaction is to provide Participant C with 
more information about you so that Participant C will be able to decide with whom to 
participate in the second half of the experiment.
In order to accomplish this, please choose one of the following topics and talk about it for 
about five minutes. If you run out of things to say about the topic that you chose, switch 
to a new topic and continue talking. It may be helpful to pretend that you are interacting 
face-to-face with another person. Inform the experimenter when you are ready to begin 
and please speak clearly once you start. The researcher will tell you when your time is up.
1. What are your favorite and least-favorite classes this semester, and why?
2. Have you decided what your major will be? If so, why? If not, what are you 
considering?
3. What qualities in other people do you appreciate and what qualities do you find 
annoying?
4. What features do you most like and dislike about your mother and father?
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Appendix I
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (1965)
1. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.
2. I feel like a person who has a number of good qualities.
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel like a failure.
4. I feel as if I am able to do things as well as most other people.
5. I feel as if I do not have much to be proud of.
6 . I take a positive attitude towards myself.
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
8 . I wish that I could have more respect for myself.
9. i  certainly feel useless at times.
10. At times I think I am no good at all.
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Appendix J
Self-Concept Clarity Scale (Campbell et al.. 1996)
1. My beliefs about myself often conflict with one another.
2. On one day I might have one opinion of myself and on another day I might have a 
different opinion.
3. I spend a lot of time wondering about what kind of person I really am.
4. Sometimes I feel that I am not really the person that I appear to be.
5. When I think about the kind of person I have been in the past, I'm not sure what I was 
really like.
6 . I seldom experience conflict between the different aspects of my personality.
7. Sometimes I think I know other people better than I know myself.
8 . My beliefs about myself seem to change very frequently.
9. If I were asked to describe my personality, my description might end up being 
different from one day to another day.
10. Even if I wanted to, I don't think I would tell someone what I'm really like.
11. In general, I have a clear sense of who I am and what I am.
12. It is often hard for me to make up my mind about things because I don't really know 
what I want.
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